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Understanding the Impact of CEO Motivations 




The market for mergers and acquisitions (M&As) is growing steadily, yet scholars claim that 
acquisitions can destroy a firm’s value and reduce operating performance (King, Dalton, Daily, & 
Covin, 2004). Many researchers argue that top managers have personal motives to undertake 
M&As that can jeopardize the shareholders’ gains (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990). However, 
research has also demonstrated that managerial ownership of the firm tends to restrain managers 
from acting in their personal best interests (Datta, Iskandar‐Datta, & Raman, 2001; Bliss & Rosen, 
2001). Higher compensation that CEOs receive after an acquisition and the reduction of the job-
related risks by diversification into unrelated businesses are often cited as factors that lead to top 
managers’ decision to undertake M&As (Harford & Li, 2007; Amihud & Lev, 1981). Despite such 
advances of knowledge in the current literature on M&As, it is still unclear how CEO motivations 
for an M&A are linked to post-acquisition underperformance of a target. To address this gap in 
the literature, this study examines the impact of self-serving motivations of top managers to 
undertake an M&A on the post-merger operating performance of a target firm. This study also 
investigates how CEO ownership affects the post-merger target performance. The results show 
that, on average, an increase in the total yearly compensation to CEOs does not have a significant 
impact on target performance one year after deal completion. Thus, large rewards granted to CEOs 
after M&As may not motivate them to achieve higher profits one year post-merger. Acquisition of 
an unrelated target, on the other hand, has a positive effect on target performance following a 
merger. This result provides evidence that CEO motives to diversify personal risks with an 
acquisition of unrelated targets do not impede post-acquisition profits. Findings also suggest that 
CEO stock ownership does not improve the post-merger operating performance of targets, mainly 
due to the very small equity stakes owned by CEOs (1.75% on average). This study contributes to 
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Over the past few decades, the number of companies undertaking mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) has substantially increased. Market analysts report that in 2018 the sum of global deals 
closed around USD 4.1 trillion, 13.9% up from 2017 (J.P. Morgan, 2018). Despite the growing 
trend, researchers have observed a decrease in firm value after deal closure (King, Dalton, Daily, 
& Covin, 2004). In academic studies on what determines post-acquisition underperformance, the 
role of chief executive officers (CEOs) stands out prominently. CEOs may have personal reasons 
to favour acquisitions over natural growth (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990), yet they are 
generally confident in the long-term positive prospects of M&As (Roll, 1986; Yang, 2015). 
Numerous studies have linked CEO motives for acquisitions with M&A outcomes, but findings 
have been mixed (Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009). In this thesis, I 
examine how the motivations of CEOs to acquire a target firm can affect the target firm’s operating 
performance by focusing on the impact of CEO compensation and ownership on a target firm’s 
one year post-acquisition operating performance.   
M&A performance is a topic that has heavily examined in the field of strategic management and 
corporate finance. Most scholars have agreed that acquisitions are value-destroying for companies 
(Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1989; Datta, Pinches, & Narayanan, 1992; King et al., 2004). However, 
there is no consensus on the reasons for this phenomenon. The factors that have been examined 
closely, such as the method of payment (cash/stock), prior acquiring experiences, and a level of 
target relatedness, have not yielded consistent conclusions (King et al., 2004). Finding little 
justification for merger activities, Datta et al. (1992) have proposed that “we may need to look at 
other factors to explain acquisition behaviour,” with the following suggestion: “[t]hese include the 
incentive compensation of managers, lack of monitoring by board of directors […] or further 
examination of why managers apparently continue to make estimation errors in valuing targets” 
(p. 80).  
In the literature on the role of CEOs in mergers and acquisitions, three theories prevail: agency, 
stewardship and hubris. Agency and hubris theories are often chosen to explain CEO’s motivations 
to undertake M&As, while stewardship perspective is often taken when the research question deals 




Agency theory takes its roots in the organizational economics. It considers managers’ as rational 
individuals acting on their personal goals if not monitored by the boards of directors, representing 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Hence, the key to the effective monitoring is a strong 
board with an independent board chair, who is able to prevent the excessive use of perquisites by 
managers. According to agency approach, CEOs pursue their personal material and non-material 
goals when make decisions to acquire (Morck, et al., 1990). Despite the popularity of agency 
theory, researchers admit that the theory has its flows. It only looks at rational side of individuals, 
omitting their psychological and social needs of self-fulfilment and realization (Davis, Schoorman, 
& Donaldson, 1997).  
Stewardship theory, as opposed to agency, represents managerial behaviour as cooperative rather 
than opportunistic. By serving the interests of shareholders, managers as stewards believe that their 
own interests are inseparable from the firm’s wellbeing. Therefore, managerial motivation towards 
firm’s performance is intrinsic, assuming the basic material needs of managers are satisfied (Davis, 
Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). Thus, stewards do not need monitoring and control to exercise 
their pro-organizational actions. In the stewardship relations, mutual trust between managers and 
owners is essential as both parties are serving the collective good (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). 
Donaldson and Davis (1991) argue that the firm’s return on equity is higher when CEO takes a 
dual role (the position of CEO and Board chair is hold by one person). Thus, top managers tend to 
serve their firms as stewards when taking full authority and leadership by occupying the both 
positions. However, in the context of M&As, Desai, Kroll and Wright (2005) have come to the 
opposite conclusion regarding the absence of outside board monitoring. They claim that 
acquisition outcomes, measured by CAR or change in ROA, are positively influenced by the 
percentage of outside board directors for the manager-controlled firms, in which neither 
shareholders nor managers have a significant share of ownership.  
Given the evidence on the high rates of post-acquisition failures, CEO’s decision to undertake 
M&A is considered to be more opportunistic than pro-organizational. But some scholars disagree 
with CEO’s self-serving motives. They insist that top managers believe in positive outcomes of 




Researchers associate hubris with managerial optimism (Yang, 2005) and overconfidence in 
making investment decisions (Ben-David, Graham, & Harvey, 2007; Malmendier & Tate, 2005). 
Acting on hubris, upper echelon relies too much on their own judgement and misinterprets market 
prices. This causes the loss of value by the bidder shareholders due to the limited abilities to derive 
adequate profits from the overpriced target. Although the theory has been empirically supported 
(Roll, 1986), there is evidence that CEOs act more on agency then on hubris when making 
decisions to undertake M&As (Devers, McNamara, Haleblian, & Yoder, 2013). Therefore, in this 
paper, an agency perspective is chosen as a theoretical base. 
According to the agency perspective CEOs seek private benefits derived from M&As. Morck et 
al. (1990) argue that CEOs can seek to acquire fast growing targets and to diversify into unrelated 
businesses to assure the survival of the firm and “to reduce the risk to their human capital” (p. 32). 
However, their analysis shows that buying growing and unrelated targets can be value-destroying 
for shareholders (Morck et al., 1990). Other reasons that can prompt CEOs to acquire a firm 
include greater compensation for increasing the firm size (Harford & Li, 2007) and the possibility 
of diversifying personal risks by acquiring unrelated targets (Amihud & Lev, 1981). While self-
serving motives of CEOs in pursuing M&As have been identified by previous research (Morck et 
al., 1990; Harford & Li, 2007), the link between these motives and post-acquisition target 
performance has not yet been examined thoroughly. To address this gap, this thesis investigates 
how an increase in CEO compensation after the deal closure can influence a target’s post-
acquisition profits. 
Prior studies have argued that managerial compensation does not have a direct impact on 
performance (Gomes-Mejia, Tosi & Hinkin, 1987; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). These studies further 
noted that “the form rather than the level of compensation is what motivates managers to increase 
firm value” (Mehran, 1995, p. 163). In light of this, many scholars have reported positive impacts 
of firm stocks and stock-based initiatives in the CEO’s compensation package on corporate returns 
(Mehran, 1995; Wright, Kroll, Lado, & Van Ness, 2002; Furfine & Rosen, 2011).   
Researchers have noticed that stock-based compensation and firm ownership tend to prevent CEOs 
from taking non-value-maximizing decisions and help yield better efficiency (Datta et al., 2001; 
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Lilienfeld-Toal & Ruenzi, 2014). However, the impact of CEO ownership on firm performance is 
not linear; the impact varies for different levels of ownership (Morck et al. ,1988). This raises the 
question of what level of stock-based compensation could incentivize CEOs to work harder to 
improve the post-acquisition performance of targets. In this regard, Hubard and Palia (1995) 
conclude that neither very small nor very high levels of equity held by top managers are effective 
in achieving positive after-merger returns. Subsequently, Core and Larcker (2002) demonstrate 
that a substantial increase of equity held by CEOs can lead to a rise in accounting and market 
performance. This suggests a positive link between a CEO’s level of ownership and post-
acquisition target performance. This link is investigated as part of this thesis. 
Previous studies reported that CEO ownership also affects decisions regarding purchasing 
unrelated targets. Firms run by CEOs with small ownership stakes (less than 10%) diversify more 
often than firms with CEOs who control over 30% of the firm’s stock (Amihud & Lev, 1981). 
Related to this, it has been shown that diversified companies experience lower CEO turnover and 
have lower pay-for-performance sensitivity (Berry, Bizjak, Lemmon, & Naveen, 2006). 
Notwithstanding, researchers agree that unrelated M&As perform poorly (Datta et al., 1992; King 
et al., 2004; Doukas & Kan, 2004). This calls attention to a discrepancy between the value-
maximizing strategy expected by shareholders and the private benefits expected by CEOs in 
pursuing diversification. While addressing this discrepancy, I argue that CEO ownership may 
mitigate the negative consequences of acquiring unrelated targets.  
The methodology of this thesis focuses on target operating performance, a variable examined by 
only a few studies in the M&A literature (Furfine & Rosen, 2011; Capron & Pistre, 2002). For 
instance, Furfine and Rosen (2011) investigated merger transactions and concluded that the higher 
risk of post-merger default was not caused by a target but by the combination of a target’s and a 
bidder’s joint risks. Capron and Pistre (2002) explain that corporates benefit when transferring 
resources from an acquirer to the target but not vice versa. Thus, focusing on the role of a target in 
realizing the merger outcomes may extend our knowledge on the processes that happen after the 
deal closure. In this respect, a change in target operating performance one year after the acquisition 
can be a reasonable indicator of how a top manager’s motives for an acquisition affect post-merger 
profits.  
The data sample used by this study was obtained from Thomson Security Data Corporation’s 
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Platinum database (SDC) and Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT Segments Reporting as well as 
ExecuComp databases. The first source helped to correctly relate bidders with targets; the last two 
were used to derive financial reporting items as well as to construct the data on the growth of 
managerial compensation and the level of ownership stakes for the period of interest. In addition 
to these databases, corporate annual reports (Form 10-K) downloaded from the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission resource (EDGAR) were checked to confirm what segment the purchased 
target was placed in. The data covers M&As of publicly listed U.S. companies for the period of 
January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2013. Multiple linear regression analyses and tests on mean 
difference were employed to identify the association between CEO compensation and stock 





Over the last 50 years, the knowledge on M&A processes and consequences has been substantially 
advanced through extensive research in diverse literatures including economics, sociology, 
accounting, finance, and management. The finance literature has focused more on the factors that 
can potentially undermine market and operating returns gained by bidder and target shareholders, 
whereas the management literature has concentrated on the role of managers in M&As. In this 
thesis, I combine these two perspectives.  
CEO motivations for undertaking an M&A 
Compensation motives  
CEOs’ expectations of greater rewards have been highlighted as one of the reasons for undertaking 
M&As. This view emerges from the proposition that the CEO compensation depends on the 
amount of assets under control rather than on the higher profits or productivity (Harford & Li, 
2007). An increase in top executives’ remuneration following an acquisition is a plausible 
motivation for many M&As. A number of studies confirm that top managers of large companies 
earn more (Morck et al., 1990; Bliss & Rosen, 2001). Thus, CEOs might be seeking the ways to 
increase their firm assets. 
Bliss and Rosen (2001) demonstrate that firm size matters in the growth of CEO compensation by 
analyzing mergers in banking industry. They conclude that CEO compensation (defined by salary, 
bonus, restricted stock and stock options) rises significantly regardless of how the assets grow 
(e.g., by capital expenditures or through acquisitions). Harford and Li (2007) extend the inferences 
of Bliss and Rosen (2001) to the other industries (beyond banks) and investigate how CEO’s 
wealth changes depending on the expansion strategy (capital expenditures vs acquisitions), and 
they find that in case of a large capital expenditure, CEOs tend to receive smaller compensation 
compared to the merger. Furthermore, CEO compensation continues to be raised after the merger, 
regardless of how the firm stocks perform (Harford & Li, 2007). However, the magnitude of its 
rise depends on the strength of the board of directors. At the presence of the strong boards, bidding 
CEO compensation becomes more sensitive to post-acquisition results (Harford & Li, 2007). 
Opponents of the compensation motive argument suggest that CEOs are more concerned with 
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investing in their own human capital rather than with the rewards from the asset growth (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1989). According to them, M&As can serve as an instrument to raise the CEO’s 
personal status and value. Top managers often select the investments that can make their expertise 
binding, unique, and difficult to be replaced. In addition, such investments can create favourable 
conditions for renegotiating a compensation package (Shleifer & Vishny,1989). Avery, Chevalier 
and Schaefer (1998) further develop Shleifer and Vishny’s (1989) argument by poin ting out that 
CEOs would rather acquire a firm “to increase their prestige and standing in the business 
community” (p. 42). The CEO’s experience in M&As usually extends their professional 
qualifications and achievements. The market of human capital tends to value an expertise in M&As 
as “the probability of a CEO adding a board seat between 1985 and 1991 increased by 11% if the 
CEO undertook an acquisition” (Avery et al.,1998, p.32). 
In today’s business world, the compensation to a CEO is a multi-component instrument that greatly 
varies across companies. Many scholars have examined how individual components in the 
remuneration package influence the quality of managerial decisions. Among various types of 
components, a stock-based component (SBC) has long been considered the most influential 
instrument as it brings the goals of top managers and those of owners together. SBC can stimulate 
top managers to increase the value of their companies (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Indeed, Mehran 
(1995) found that the percentage of equity-based compensation and that of equity held by 
managers correlate positively with firm performance (Tobin’s Q and ROA). Similarly, according 
to Datta, Iskandar‐Datta and Raman (2001), top executives who receive large stock-based rewards 
tend to pay less acquisition premiums and choose targets with higher growth opportunities. 
However, Bliss and Rosen (2001) found that CEOs compensated with stocks are less likely to 
pursue mergers.  
Some authors have looked more closely at different levels of equity held by managers and their 
impact on firm performance. Many of them claim that the correlation between managerial 
ownership and performance is not linear. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) proposed two 
hypotheses to explain the role of managerial ownership (firm stock held by top corporate officers 
and by the other members of the board) in examining firm value using Tobin’s Q. Their first 
hypothesis (convergence-of-interest hypothesis) states that the value of a firm grows with the 
growth of managerial ownership given that the goals of the two parties are aligned. The second 
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hypothesis (managerial entrenchment hypothesis) stipulates that managers who have higher levels 
of ownership may have enough voting power to overcome the internal controls and thus exploit 
perquisites from their position (Morck et al.,1988). By conducting an empirical study on the 
Fortune 500 companies, Morck et al. (1988) concluded that at a small level of ownership (up to 
5%) the convergence-of-interest effect prevails, thereby making the value of a firm to rise, while 
in the range of 5 to 25%, the goal alignment becomes suppressed by managerial entrenchment, 
thereby causing an adverse effect on firm value. If managerial ownership surpasses 25%, the first 
hypothesis prevails again, and the firm’s market value starts to rise but at a lower rate.  Finally, 
even when Morck et al. (1988) repeated the analysis using the operating profit measure instead of 
market value, the results were similar.  Furthermore, Hubbard and Palia (1995) changed the 
Tobin’s Q measure (that was used by Morck et al. (1988)) to 9-days abnormal returns around the 
acquisition date and come to the similar conclusions. At low levels of equity, managers tend to 
overconsume perquisites while at high levels they apprehend the loss of control and make less 
risky decisions, which led to the reduction of firm value (Hubbard & Palia, 1995). 
Stock-based initiatives offered to managers often include stock-options. Wright, Kroll, Lado, and 
Van Ness (2002) have differentiated the CEO’s equity holdings from CEO’s option holdings in 
their analysis. This differentiation allowed them to conclude that the percentage of options held by 
CEOs lead to consistent maximization of the acquirers’ returns while equity holdings do not have 
this effect. In contract, Furfine and Rosen (2011) report that mergers completed by CEOs with 
large option-based compensation have an above average risk of default. These results suggest that 
the relationship between CEO compensation and post-acquisition performance requires a more 
nuanced examination.  
Risk Diversification Motives  
In order to understand why managers would want to buy unrelated businesses, I start by discussing 
the influence of diversification on the post-merger firm performance. I then proceed to the CEO 
motivations for choosing unrelated targets. For this study, unrelated and conglomerate M&As are 
used interchangeably.  
Target relatedness has long been considered an important determinant of an acquisition success. 
Management literature looks at target-acquirer relatedness as a source of synergy that a bidder 
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expects post-acquisition. Barney (1988) defines an acquirer and target as strategically related when 
its total net present value (NPV) is higher than the sum of separate NPVs of each company 
separately. He refers to strategic relatedness in a financial sense, other than the commonly implied 
business similarity. The scholar claims that “synergic cash-flows stemming from relatedness will 
lead to abnormal returns for shareholders of bidding firms when those cash flows are private and 
unique, inimitable and unique, or unexpected” (Barney, 1988. p. 77). Therefore, bidders should 
expect additional costs in connection with exploring strategic relatedness between themselves and 
targets (Barney, 1988).  
Further, Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson and Ireland (1991) propose that operating synergy can be 
reached through resource similarity (target and bidder resources are identical) and resource 
complementarity (the resources are not identical but rather complementary). The impact of 
resource similarity on firm’s post-acquisition performance is convoyed by means of the economies 
of scope and scale. The impact of resource complementarity assumes an acquirer and a target can 
produce unique, inimitable and private resource combination that should result in a long-term 
positive effect on performance. By measuring resource similarity and differences by the level of 
R&D intensity, capital intensity, administrative and debt intensity, Harrison et al. (1991) conclude 
that resource complementarity is more valuable for the strategic advantage of an acquiring firm 
than resource similarity.  
Pehrsson (2006) emphasizes that business relatedness is multidimensional construct, more 
complex than commonly practiced binary approach of comparing the industries by Standard 
Industry Classification (SIC) code. Based on managerial perceptions, Pehrsson (2006) defines six 
main factors identifying the level of relatedness: Product technology, General management skills, 
End customers, Brand recognition, Supply chain types and Market knowledge. Further, he groups 
the factors into 4 clusters (High relatedness, Low relatedness, Customer relatedness and 
Technology relatedness) and investigates the performance consequences, measured by ROA for 
each cluster of relatedness. The results demonstrated that Technology relatedness led to the highest 
profitability compared to the other clusters. Customer relatedness didn’t show any significant 
effect on performance. However, high level of relatedness had a significant negative effect on 
firm’s ROA. According to Pehrsson (2006), both high level and low level of relatedness did not 
allow firms to build a sustainable competitive advantage. In the first case, he explained, the 
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identical businesses had little possibilities for the economies of scope. In the second, too many 
differences created additional complexity and pressure on strategy realization. 
Finkelstein and Haleblian (2002) emphasize the positive effect of acquirer-to-target knowledge 
transfer in similar acquisitions, but in the case of a second acquisition, the positive effect 
diminishes and become negative if the target is unrelated (Finkelstein & Haleblian, 2002).  
At the same time, however, scholars are cautious regarding the effect of unrelated deals. Meta-
analytical reviews suggest that bidders avoid unrelated acquisitions since diversification 
contributes to losing value in subsequent years (Datta et al., 1992; King et al., 2004). Given that 
diversification has long been considered a value-increasing strategy, asserting that diversification 
brings greater risks is counterintuitive. Expanding to new markets opens up attractive opportunities 
for bidders. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989) point out that conglomerate mergers perform much 
better than their single-industry counterparts. However, in subsequent studies, scholars notice that 
individual companies could be traded higher if they remained as separate entities (Berger & Ofek, 
1995). Thus, a concept of diversification discount has come into play. Doukas and Kan (2004) 
show that conglomerates tend to be traded at a discount and produce less cash flows compared to 
the focused peers. Subsequent research provides more evidence for the low potential of unrelated 
M&As. Freund, Trahan and Vasudevan (2007) examine three year post-merger operating returns 
of corporations with global and industrial diversification and find them to be underperforming. A 
meta-analysis of 14 studies on the performance of conglomerates demonstrate a decrease in post-
acquisition market returns over a period of one month to five years after the merger (King et al., 
2004).  
Berger and Ofek (1995) evaluate positive and negative effects of diversification on firm value. 
Their research reveals that the opportunities for tax reduction combined with the access to larger 
amounts of debt, commonly mentioned as a positive effect of diversification, have a modest impact 
on firm value. Negative effects, on the other hand, appeared to be significant. Managers distribute 
corporate funds to support all business directions regardless of the stage of their life cycle. 
Resource allocation from more successful to less productive segments occurred in 26% of cases 
for multi-segment companies (Berger & Ofek, 1995). As a result, the full potential of growing 
segments cannot be realized in time.  
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Facing the growing evidence of the performance issues of unrelated acquisitions, many scholars 
have asked why diversification is still popular among top executives. Several reasons have been 
suggested: one of them can be the reduction of the personal risks, including the risk of losing a job 
and good professional standing when the main business line faces losses (Morck et al.,  1990). This 
motivation draws on CEO’s financial dependence upon the company he or she represents. Amihud 
and Lev (1981) contrasted the abilities of shareholders to diversify personal risks and those of top 
managers. Firm owners have many possibilities to reduce their risk exposure by investing in 
various industries while managers can only diversify their risks within the boundaries of their 
position in the company. The empirical results confirm this view by showing that manager-
controlled firms do more conglomerate acquisitions than owner-controlled counterparts (Amihud 
& Lev, 1981).  
Lane, Canella and Lubatkin (1998) come with a critique of Amihud and Lev (1981) approach by 
arguing that there is little justification for managerial self-benefiting objectives in diversifying 
through acquisition of unrelated targets. They propose that diversification strategy, aimed to 
reduce unsystematic risk, is important for the company and therefore benefits shareholders and 
managers alike. However, the empirical evidence contradicts this proposition and appears to be in 
line with agency perspective, suggesting positive relationship between ownership concentration 
and firm’s unsystematic risk. 
In many situations, CEOs are unable to predict or control the decisions of shareholders to keep, 
transform, or divest the business. Faced with such uncertainty, any employee would take steps to 
preserve their earnings, status, and competitiveness on the human resources market. There could 
be a situation where a “CEO with experience in marketing or sales becomes less valuable than a 
cost-cutter when the firm loses its technological lead and has to sell a less differentiated more 
competitively priced product” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989, p. 134). Thus, the risk of being replaced 
urges managers to choose another unrelated business as a backup.  
Apart from job-related risks, managers may favour unrelated acquisitions for the possibility of 
covering underperformance (Morck et al., 1990). CEOs, facing losses in a core business line, tend 
to search to compensate the losses with the acquisition of a target from a more attractive, usually 
unrelated economic sector. In such a case, a lack of experiences in the new industry and previous 
setbacks only make things worse (Morck et al.,1990). Also, the negative effect on post-acquisition 
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performance can stem from unrealistic managerial ambitions regarding their capabilities to 
succeed in the other industries. 
Post-Acquisition Performance of Acquirer and Target 
Performance of an acquirer has remained a key topic in the business literature for more than four 
decades. A quick search yields approximately 250 peer reviewed articles, predominantly in the 
field of strategic management and finance. Almost all works measure post-acquisition results with 
market returns or losses gained or experienced by the bidder or the target shareholders.   
A majority of studies have found that acquisitions have a negative impact on the bidder’s returns 
in a medium and long-term period (Agrawal, Jaffe, & Mandelker, 1992; King et al., 2004; Andre, 
Kooli, & L’her, 2004; Ma, Whidbee, & Zhang, 2011). Still, some studies do observe positive 
earnings, at least for the target’s shareholders (Datta et al.,1992). For example, the meta-analytical 
work of Datta et al. (1992) shows that   target’s shareholders tend to experience more than 20% 
growth in wealth around the date of M&A announcement (10 days before and 10 days after) while 
bidder shareholders’ returns tend to grow by less than 0.5%. Subsequent research by King et al. 
(2004) shows that the shareholders of both acquired and acquiring firms earn at the deal 
announcement (from day 0 to 5), but starting from the 6th day post-announcement, the acquiring 
firm’s abnormal returns become insignificant or negative. Operating results measured by ROA, 
ROE, and ROS follow the same direction (King et al., 2004). These results suggest that only target 
shareholders can expect cash gains after the acquisition deal.   
Compared to the performance of firm stocks, operating performance after M&As has been much 
less studied. Ghosh (2001) has found that the operating performance of an acquirer (measured by 
a change in firm’s cash flows) does not increase after a merger. To explain this finding, he also 
checked for the impact of the method of payment on post-merger profits. Even though cash 
acquisitions produced greater cash flows than stock ones, the expected positive synergy was not 
documented (Ghosh, 2001).  
A target’s operating performance has been even more rarely examined in the literature. 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989) were among the first to evaluate target performance before and 
after the acquisition. They examined whether acquired companies were underperformers and 
whether the change of management team has improved their post-merger operating results. 
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Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989) reported that targets did not underperform prior to the mergers 
and explained the phenomenon by referring to the specificity of the sample: “On average, US 
acquisitions of the late 1960s and early 1970s exhibited a selection bias toward extraordinarily 
profitable companies, the more so, the smaller the target was.” (Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1989, p. 
115). Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989) further compared the performance of targets and unacquired 
firms. Seven to eight years after a merger deal, the performance of targets was lower than the 
unacquired firms from a similar industry. The decrease of value was aligned with a slower growth 
rate of acquired firms. The researchers proposed that bidders might be unable or unwilling to invest 
in a rapidly growing targets, which potentially hindered its profitability. Ravenscraft and Scherer 
(1989) also highlight another reason—a significant number of the asset divestitures following the 
mergers, which could signal the potential problems in “managerial competence and/or motivation” 
(p.115). 
After being acquired, targets usually operate either as a separate business line or as a part of the 
existing segment.  Chemmanur, Krishnan and Nandy (2014) examine the sources and conditions 
of productivity improvement in spun-off segments: firms sell (spin-off) part of its interest in the 
segment and further consider this segment a subsidiary. The evidence suggests that spun-off plants 
significantly increase their productivity starting from the first year as a subsidiary. The main source 
of improvement was the reduction of employees, total wages, and material costs (Chemmanur et 
al., 2014).  One of the scenarios stipulated a sale of the firm’s stake in the subsidiary after the spin-
off. Such spin-offs have demonstrated a delayed improvement in productivity rather than 
immediate (Chemmanur et al., 2014).  
In management literature, synergy of target’s and acquirer’s resources becomes the focal point of 
the research on post-acquisition performance. Brush (1996) investigated post-acquisition 
competitive performance (market share) of the acquired business units during the second wave of 
acquisitions (1980s). He found strong support for the hypothesis that predicted sales-weighted 
market share of the acquired business unit increased one year after the acquisition. Brush (1996) 
argues that the source of the mentioned increase is operating synergy between target and bidder. 
He indicates 7 types of operating interrelationships based on resource- and activity-sharing that 
constitute a source of the operating synergy. Among them are functional interrelationships (R&D, 
industrial and consumer advertising), operational interrelationships (supplier and customer ties), 
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forward and backward integration. These relationships, according to Brush (1996), account for 
84% of variance in post-acquisition sales of the acquired business units.   
Several recent works on target performance have focused on cross-border vs domestic acquisitions 
(Bebenroth & Hemmert, 2015; Bertrand & Zitouna, 2008). Bertrand and Zitouna (2008) 
demonstrate positive changes in the target productivity especially for cross-border acquisitions. 
However, their analysis shows no evidence that M&As affect the profits of domestic and cross-
border targets of French manufacturing firms (Bertrand & Zitouna, 2008). On the other hand, 
Bebenroth and Hemmert (2015) suggest that the targets acquired by firms overseas generally show 
a slight increase in ROA and asset growth despite managerial and cultural distance, which can 
negatively affect business operations of those targets. Findings of both studies attest the need for 





Agency Theory  
The relationship between owners and managers has traditionally been viewed through the prism 
of agency theory. Therefore, this study uses agency theory as a conceptual guide. This theory 
conjectures a conflict of interest between owners as principals and managers as agents. This 
relationship is based on a contract stipulating that owners delegate their decision-making authority 
to agents (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Managers as agents receive compensation for acting in the 
shareholders’ best interests. Both parties make decisions aimed to maximize their personal wealth 
under given conditions. However, it is unrealistic to propose that agents’ and principals’ respective 
maximum wealth can be reached simultaneously for two reasons (Ross, 1973). First, because of 
the uncertainty—knowledge about the market is limited for the two parties. Second, because it is 
economically inefficient for a principal to monitor and predict every action a manager should take 
(Ross, 1973). Thus, a principal bears costs derived from transferring its business operating 
functions to agents. Part of those costs is managerial compensation, which is largely determined 
by the market and performance. Another part, the monitoring costs, are difficult to evaluate. Under 
the agency approach, managers will act based on their personal interests if there is lack of 
monitoring from the boards that represent shareholders. Therefore, the principals’ losses due to 
monitoring costs and issues can be very high. 
Theorists identify two levels of control over management: internal and external (Sundaram, 2004). 
The first level refers to corporate governance practices and the second level refers to the concept 
of the market for corporate control. 
Corporate Governance 
The contractual relationship between managers and owners varies depending on corporate 
governance systems. Sundaram (2004) suggests that “corporate governance practices define the 
role of the boards and officers of the corporation, and account for a considerable portion of the job 
description of a CEO” (p. 199). Corporate governance is more of a process than a stable system 
(Sundaram, 2004) in that it changes and evolves depending on political, cultural, and business 
environments. The North American corporate governance model has a dispersed ownership 
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structure. Under this model, many private and institutional shareholders tend to hold a relatively 
small amount of equity stakes; consequently, these shareholders do not exert enough control power 
over management. Therefore, shareholders must rely on the board of directors to internally monitor 
a company’s actions. However, in reality, boards often team up with managers and thus fail in 
their controlling function (Sundaram, 2004; Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2008; Krug et al., 2015). 
As Sundaram (2004) points out, “boards of many leading companies (and even governance 
standard-setting institutions such as the New Stork Stock Exchange) were ineffective, seemingly 
lacking the ability, interest, or competence to challenge CEOs” (p. 216). In today’s complex 
business environment, CEOs have more opportunities to pursue non value-maximizing strategies 
since established internal control methods have become inefficient. Some researchers view M&As 
as an external mechanism that controls managerial efficiency (Mann, 1965; Sundaram, 2004). This 
mechanism is often referred to as a market for corporate control. 
Market for Corporate Control 
Manne (1965) introduced the concept of the “market for corporate control” to explain how the 
threat of a corporate takeover can discipline top managers. This concept describes an organization 
as a complex of assets that are correctly priced by the market. If stock prices decline, this signals 
that the firm has unrealized potential due to inefficient management. Underperforming companies 
become candidates for takeovers since bidders look for opportunities hidden in undervalued assets.   
The concept of the market for corporate control has found its supporters and opponents. Davis and 
Stout (1992) reported that companies with above average returns receive fewer takeover bids. 
Zollo and Singh (2004), however, claimed the opposite—that a change of management in low-
performing targets does not improve post-acquisition performance. The same conclusion was 
reached by Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989) who claimed that acquired firms actually outperform 
their peers prior to a deal. Thus, the assumption that M&As serve as an external method of 
disciplining CEOs has not provided consistent results across studies.  
Managerial Opportunism in M&A 
In the absence of the external and internal controls explained above, managers have opportunities 
to engage in self-benefiting strategies (Morck et al., 1990). These types of actions are often termed 
‘managerialism’ or ‘managerial opportunism’ (Morck et al., 1990; Kang, 2006). Having 
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documented a loss of post-merger value, scholars investigate what personal benefits managers 
might pursue when they choose to acquire another firm (Morck et al., 1990; Bliss & Rosen, 2001). 
Ineffective monitoring mechanisms and weak boards of directors allow CEOs to make non-value 
maximizing decisions, causing a decrease of the firm’s market returns (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
One of the first references to the managerial role in initiating an M&A is grounded in the free cash 
flow theory (Jensen,1986). Executives of companies with large cash flows on hand would rather 
spend the cash on an M&A than distributing it to shareholders through dividends. This theory 
“implies managers of firms with unused borrowing power and large free cash-flows are more likely 
to undertake low-benefit or even value-destroying mergers” (Jensen, 1986, p. 328). Jensen (1986) 
further argues that high leverage should prevent companies from spending cash on value-
destroying projects. With the rise of debt- and stock-financed deals, it became obvious that 
acquiring CEOs might pursue other motives for M&As beyond spending excessive cash. 
Managerial opportunism in M&As can be realized through the following: the reduction of the 
personal risks linked to the CEO’s employment (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Shleifer & Vishny, 1989), 
overpaying for the rapidly growing targets and diversifying to cover up the managerial flaws in 
the main business (Morck et al., 1990), better career perspectives (Avery et al., 1998), and increase 





 Hypotheses  
 
CEO Compensation and Post-Acquisition Target Performance  
As agency theory predicts, CEOs’ business decisions can be significantly influenced by their 
personal interests which do not always align with those of the shareholders. For example, a CEO’s 
decision to conduct M&As can be made based on the knowledge that their compensation will rise 
with firm’s growth (Bliss & Rosen, 2001; Harford & Li, 2007), given that  top managers of large 
corporations tend to earn more (Murphy, 1985; Jensen & Murphy, 1990).  
However, not all means of firm growth are equally rewarding CEOs. Indeed, for large capital 
expenditures, top managers are rewarded with much less incentives than for M&As (Harford & 
Li, 2007). Mergers are more financially rewarding CEOs than large capital expenditures regardless 
of the firm-level outcomes gained through the mergers (Kroll et al., 1990; Bliss & Rosen, 200l). 
Furthermore, a low level of pay-for-performance incentives after mergers (Harford & Li, 2007) 
and weak boards (Sundaram, 2006) create a context in which top executives can make decisions 
that maximize their personal benefits at the expense of shareholders (Morck et al.,1990). The fact 
that M&As tend to have high failure rates (Datta et al.,1992) suggests that the boards that represent 
shareholders, are not usually effective in controlling managers’ self-benefiting decisions and they 
may even reward managers for their opportunistic behaviour.  
Conversely, knowing that M&As have an increased risk of default (Furfine & Rosen, 2011) but 
potentially can bring strategic advantages (Brush, 1996), the boards may incentivize CEOs with 
higher compensation so that they can take risks and put more efforts into achieving better post-
acquisition results. According to agency theory, the separation of company ownership and control 
results in a conflict of interests between principals and agents (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In this 
respect, managerial compensation (both material and non-material) can serve as incentive for 
agents to make their decisions to fulfill the principals’ goals and interests, rather than their own. 
According to this theoretical perspective, the remuneration to a CEO should be linked to firm 
performance (Murphy, 1985).  
However, research shows that relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance is 
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not that strong as agency theory implies (Jensen & Murphy, 1990) especially in the M&A context 
(Harford & Li, 2007). Indeed, several studies report that managerial compensation incentives are 
both inadequate and insensitive to firm performance (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Kroll, Simmons & 
Wright, 1990). Jensen and Murphy (1990) claim that with each $1000 of growth in shareholder 
wealth, CEO remuneration rises by only $3.25 on average; of which stock awards constitute the 
largest part. Meanwhile, the average base salary of CEOs changes by only $0.02. If market returns 
are substituted with corporate income, the impact on performance is even lower, 17.7¢ on average 
with each $1000 change of the annual income. Therefore, CEOs receive only a tiny portion of the 
wealth earned by firm shareholders. Considering these trivial performance incentives, an increase 
in managerial compensation after an M&A may not encourage CEOs to work harder in the post-
acquisition period.  Indeed, researchers point out that an increase of CEO compensation observed 
after an M&A is detached from the firm performance not only for the period one year after the 
acquisition (Kroll et al. ,1990) but also for the 3 subsequent years (Harford & Li, 2007).  
Based on these findings, I argue that the expected growth of CEO compensation after a merger 
may function as an a priori motivating factor for a CEO to move forward toward an M&A, but not 
as a disciplining factor to avoid post-merger under-performance. More specifically, I propose that 
the growth of CEO compensation after the acquisition will not make CEOs to achieve better post-
merger results.   
A common approach in the business literature to assess the merger outcome is to determine average 
stock market returns for a specific time period. Operating results are considered less informative 
and more prone to managerial manipulations, whereas stock returns may be affected by various 
concurrent yet independent events. Assuming the target’s profitability is vital for the acquirer, its 
operating performance is worth examining. Therefore, I examine target ROA and ROS one year 
after the acquisition as a dependent variable to indicate post-acquisition performance.  
Hypothesis 1: The year-to-year growth of the CEO’s total compensation will have a negligible 






CEO Ownership and Post-Acquisition Target Performance 
Stock-based compensation (SBC) of CEOs has long been considered an effective way of reducing 
the agency costs, since agents have more reasons to act in the best interest of the principals 
(Sundaram, 2004). Managers receive stock-based compensation through various types of plans 
and initiatives such as stocks, stock option rewards, restricted stocks, or specific equity-related 
plans. This paper does not distinguish between the effects of each compensation type, but rather 
concentrates on the CEO’s total ownership level as an indicator of SBC.  
Owner-controlled firms have a history of better management (Mehran, 1995). Researchers observe 
a direct relationship between the level of CEO ownership and company returns. Indeed, “firm 
performance is positively related to the percentage of equity held by managers and to the 
percentage of their compensation that is equity-based” (Mehran, 1995, p. 163). Later, Lilienfeld-
Toal and Ruenzi (2014) confirm the results obtained by Mehran (1995) and add that CEO-owners 
are better at reducing costs and producing higher operating profits.  
In the field of M&As, managerial stock-ownership is associated with higher post-acquisition 
market returns (Wright et al., 2002). For example, Yen and Andre (2007) discovered a positive 
relationship between the level of CEO ownership and the operating cash-flow of the acquirer. 
Datta et al. (2001) confirm that top executives compensated with equity do not overpay for targets 
and therefore achieve positive stock returns over a three-year period after the acquisition. The 
findings of these studies provide theoretical and empirical grounds for the hypothesis that CEOs 
with higher stakes in the company are more likely to outperform their peers with smaller stakes. 
The positive impact of CEO ownership on post-acquisition performance can be attributed 
primarily to the strategic decisions made in favour of shareholders. Bliss and Rosen (2001) report 
that CEOs compensated with stocks are less likely to engage in growth through acquisitions 
compared to managers compensated with cash. Comparable results were subsequently obtained by 
Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014), who pointed out that owner-CEOs tend to show better returns 
in situations of weak corporate governance while receiving smaller compensation compared to 
non-owners. Given that owner-CEOs are more efficient and less active in M&A, they might invest 
more of their efforts into target performance. Therefore, I expect the post-acquisition performance 
of a target to be positively related to the level of CEO ownership of the firm. 
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Despite the encouraging influence of SBC on managerial efficiency, CEOs can still hold very 
small percentages of firm equity that may not be enough for the convergence of interests between 
principals and agents (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). The issue of identifying the optimal level of 
stock ownership comes into focus. Morck et al. (1988) demonstrate that managerial equity 
holdings of up to 5% can bring about the convergence of interests, whereas at the higher ownership 
levels (above 25%) risk-averseness can restrain managers from taking potentially value-increasing 
actions (Hubbard & Palia, 1995; Wright et al., 2002). These findings suggest that CEO ownership 
and post-acquisition performance do not have a monotonic linear relationship. Based on the 
mentioned arguments, I propose the following two hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2a: The percentage of the CEO’s total ownership has a positive impact on post-
acquisition target performance. 
Several studies have shown that CEOs tend to receive a large option-based compensation after 
acquisition deals (Devers et al., 2013). Furthermore, CEOs and directors exercise their options 
before acquisition and sell them following acquisition announcement, thereby generating earnings 
from the short-term increase of stock price (Devers et al., 2013). Similarly, Sanders and Hambrick 
(2007) argue that a large option-based compensation often motivates CEOs to make extremely 
risky investments that often lead to sizeable losses for their firms. Therefore, I differentiate 
between the influence of CEO’s total ownership in the firm and CEO’s total ownership excluding 
stock options. 
Hypothesis 2b: The percentage of the CEO’s total ownership excluding stock options has a 
positive impact on post-acquisition target performance and this positive impact will be greater 
than the impact of CEO’s total ownership. 
 
CEO Motivations to Acquire Unrelated Targets and Its Performance Consequences  
Operating within a single industry makes a firm vulnerable to various uncontrollable threats. This 
problem can be mitigated by acquiring a target from a different industry sector. On the downside, 
conglomerate mergers can cause a decline in post-acquisition performance (Doukas & Kan, 2004; 
Freund, Trahan, & Vasudevan, 2007). Therefore, while multi-business firms can benefit from 
diversification, they also reportedly have greater rates of default. 
The bidder can encounter greater challenges when deploying unrelated target resources compared 
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to related ones. The sharing of resources, knowledge, and markets is complicated by industry 
differences which can cause substantial financial losses for the firm. Moreover, Berger and Ofek 
(1995) found that unrelated business segments use excessive capital expenditures. This means that 
unrelated targets can perform worse after M&As. Indeed, studies suggest that unrelated 
acquisitions can weaken market value and reduce operating results three years after a deal (Doukas 
& Kan, 2004; Freund et al., 2007). Therefore, if unrelated acquisitions do not improve a bidder’s 
financial standing, then the question remains as to why CEOs would acquire them.  
Managerial motives in acquiring unrelated targets can be viewed through the lens of agency theory. 
Ineffective corporate governance may result in the personal interests of CEOs taking precedence 
over those of shareholders and can increase the agency costs carried by the principals. Berger and 
Ofek (1995) argue that “the evidence that diversification represented a suboptimal managerial 
strategy raises questions about the effectiveness of the corporate control and monitoring 
mechanisms in place during this (the 1980s) period” (p. 60).  
CEO preferences of conglomerate mergers are often linked to managerial position and status. Top 
managers reduce unsystematic risk associated with a specific company or industry, and in doing 
so, they secure their employment income and status. This strategy, however, may not be in the best 
interests of shareholders, who can diversify their own portfolios more efficiently (Amihud & Lev, 
1981). Empirical results support employment risk aversion as a motivation for diversification. 
According to Berry et al. (2006), “CEO turnover in diversified firms is completely insensitive to 
both accounting and stock-price performance, but CEO turnover in focused firms is sensitive to 
firm performance” (p. 797). As rationally acting individuals, managers can diversify their risks by 
expanding into other industries, even if this diversification does not work in the best interest of 
shareholders.   
Hypothesis 3a: Unrelated acquisitions have a negative impact on post-acquisition target 
performance. 
Following the principles of agency theory, managerial ownership can mitigate the negative 
consequences of acquiring an unrelated target. Stock-based compensation offered to CEOs by 
numerous corporations is aimed to ensure that shareholder wealth will grow. Amihud and Lev 
(1981) report that manager-controlled firms acquire unrelated targets more often than their owner-
controlled counterparts. Therefore, my next hypothesis proposes that CEO ownership positively 
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impacts post-merger financial results of unrelated targets.   
Hypothesis 3b: The CEO’s total ownership has a positive impact on post-acquisition performance 





Sample Development  
This study examines the US and Canadian firms that are publicly listed and undertook M&As 
between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2013. The sample includes only completed deals; it 
does not contain financial sector companies. Only targets with a majority stake of 50% or more of 
the acquired ownership were considered.  
The initial reception of the M&A deal type (e.g., hostile, neutral, friendly, etc.) was not considered. 
Deal types such as spinoffs, recapitalizations, self-tenders, repurchases and privatizations were 
also excluded from the sample. No distinction was made among different forms of M&As: 
leverage buyouts, tender offers, exchange offers or acquisitions of minority interests.   
The sample was obtained in two stages. In the first stage, I identified companies that presumably 
made acquisitions between 2006 and 2013. An interim sample was obtained by matching Standard 
& Poors’ COMPUSTAT Segments Reporting database (Compustat) and Thomson Security Data 
Corporation’s Platinum database (SDC) for the period in question. The two databases were 
matched on the acquirers’ CUSIP codes (Committee on Uniform Security Identification 
Procedures), SIC codes (Standard Industry Classification) of the target and segment and on the 
year of acquisition matched with the year of reporting the segment(s) by the acquirer. The resulting 
sample contained a list of matched target-segments combinations (346 targets and 2948 target-
segment combinations) that the acquirer reported a year after the acquisition (Table 1). 
A manual check of the annual reports (form 10-K) downloaded from EDGAR (U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission) showed that acquirers placed their targets into the existing segments or 
reorganized their reported segments following the M&A rather than creating new segments out of 
the purchased companies. Therefore, the sample required a confirmation regarding the segment(s) 
to which the target(s) was added.  
The confirmation was done manually by searching the annual reports of each acquirer. Firms often 
describe the completed M&As and mention the segment(s) into which they placed the newly 
acquired targets in the Management Discussion section of the annual report. Thus, the name of the 
target(s) and the name of the segment(s) were confirmed. If the targets’ or segments’ names were 
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not specifically mentioned in the annual report, such observations were deleted. Annual reports of 
some acquirers were not present in EDGAR, which further reduced the initial data sample. 
The internal deals, when acquirer and target belong to the same group of companies were removed 
from the data set. The sample size was further reduced by the 27 acquisitions that implied purchase 
of the equity stake below the 50% threshold. Next, 13 companies chose not to disclose the 
percentage of ownership in their acquisitions. For them, the decision was made based on the 
information provided by the management in the companies’ annual reports.  
After cleaning the data, only 344 segments (280 targets) were left from the initial sample of 2,948. 
These observations constitute a list of targets and segments to which these targets were placed. 
Table 1 below shows the main steps taken to obtain a sample, and also it shows how the size of a 
sample decreases along the way. 
Further, this list of confirmed segments is supplemented with target performance variables (net 
income, total assets, and sales) and acquirer’s CEO ownership and compensation variables. All 
financial reporting data that was used in the calculation of dependent and independent variables 
was obtained from the COMPUSTAT Segment Reporting and ExecuComp databases.  
The final sample is comprised of 113 observations (Table 1), which accounts for situations where 
an acquirer allocated a target among several segments or purchased several targets in one year and 

















Description of the steps in sample development 
   
485 050 n/a Sample size obtained from COMPUSTAT Segments reporting for 
2007-2013 
4 690 n/a Sample size obtained from SDC Mergers and Acquisitions for 
2006-2013 
2 948 346  Number of observations after matching COMPUSTAT Segments 
Reporting sample with SDC sample 
344 280 Sample size after manual check with annual reports to confirm the 
segment(s) into which the target was allocated after the 
acquisition 
288 197 Sample size after deleting missing variables for segment Net 
Income and removing duplicates 
195 195 Sample size after matching with COMPUSTAT Companies 
database to find target performance (Sales, Net Income, Total 
Assets) one year before deal 
113 113 Sample size after adding CEO Compensation and Ownership 
variables from COMPUSTAT ExecuComp.  Final number of 
observations 
 
Initially, I expected that purchased targets would become new segments after the acquisition. 
However, this did not happen in the majority of cases; only five acquirers matched this initial 
prediction. Although this low number of matches does not provide a scope for analysis, some 
conclusions can still be drawn. For example, none of the acquirers reported segment net income 
one year post- acquisition (Appendix B, Table 1). In three cases out of five, segment sales dropped 
one year post- acquisition, but CEO remuneration growth did not reflect this change (Appendix B, 
Table 1).  
Analysis of Outliers 
 The cases described below were removed not only due to their influence on the results but mainly 
due to their erroneous look. In the case of Boston Scientific Corporation that acquired CryoCor 
Inc. in 2008, the target’s ROS before the deal was -26.66 due to high losses (-$15.76 million) and 
low sales ($0.59 million).  This target was underperforming before being acquired, which is not 
extraordinary. There are other factors that make this observation troubling. A year after the deal, 
the acquirer’s (Boston Scientific Corporation) segment also reported losses of $1,025 million. 
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Considering that the target’s assets accounts for only 0.06% of the acquirer’s ones, the merger 
could not be the key reason of the performance drop. This case is outstanding and disturbing for 
the results and therefore it was deleted.  
CuraGen Corporation, the target for Celldex Therapeutics Inc., had a pre-merger ROS that 
equalled 21.11, enormously high. The target reported net income of $24.78 million when sales 
were only $1.17 million. This observation does not look correct and therefore it was removed.  
The third outlier includes an underperforming target and a significantly larger acquirer which 
absorbed the poor operating results of the first. Omthera Pharmaceuticals Inc. was clearly 
underperforming with assets of $3 million and a reported loss of -$27.56 million. It merged with 
a larger corporation, Astrazeneca Plc., with total identifiable segment assets of $58,595 million 
and net income of $1,23 million. The growth of ROA occurred due to the segment’s large size 
relative to the target. Whether the target’s operations improved is debatable. With the target’s pre-
deal ROA of -9.16 the average sample statistics is substantially affected. The observation does not 
provide much information but distort the analysis results. 
Apart from these cases, there were other troublesome observations. Some corporations claimed an 
extraordinarily high percentage increase in CEO’s total compensation for the acquisition year. 
Four companies claimed 907.05%, 661.84%, 634.67%, and 554.9% growth of CEO’ total 
compensation for the year of the M&A deal completion. When the extreme cases are excluded, the 
average CEO compensation growth drops from 44.42% (median 12.15%) to 23.95% (median 
11.09%).  
The removed cases may well represent tendencies that need further investigation. A larger sample 
would have provided better insight to this matter. For our sample, however, these four observations 
stand apart from the others and have a great influence on the statistical results. The next maximum 
compensation, after its removal becomes 225%.  
After removing disturbing and erroneous data, we are left with 104 observations for target ROA 






Dependent variables  
Post-acquisition target performance is assessed through a change in the acquirer’s segment ROA 
and ROS after the acquisition compared to the target’s ROA and ROS before the acquisition 
(Figure 1). ROA and ROS ratios are calculated using target and segment net income instead of 
operating income (EBIT) or operating income before depreciation and interest payments 
(EBITDA). However, EBIT and EBITDA would be a better choice for ROA and ROS estimation, 
the deficiency of segment reporting for these items does not provide an adequate sample for the 
analysis. For example, a shift to EBIT instead of net income, yielded 33 observations in total. 
 
Figure 1:  Target performance before and after the acquisition date 
 
1. Target ROA development (TPROA)—a change of the target’s ROA after the acquisition. 
TPROA= ROA s, t+1 –ROA T, t-1; where 
ROA s, t+1 –return on assets of a specific segment one year after the acquisition, calculated as  
ROA s, t+1 = Segment Net Income, t+1/ Segment Identifiable Assets, t+1. 
ROA T, t-1—return on assets of a target one year before the acquisition, calculated as 
ROA T, t-1= Target Net Income, t-1/ Target Total Assets, t-1. 
Target ROA, ROS one 
year before the merger, 
at (t-1) 
Segment ROA, ROS in 
the year of the merger, 
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Segment ROA, ROS one 
year after the merger, at 
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2. Target ROS development (TPROS)—a change of target ROS after the acquisition. 
TPROS= ROS s, t+1 –ROS T, t-1; where 
ROS s, t+1 –return on sales of a specific segment one year after the acquisition, calculated as  
ROS s, t+1 = Segment Net Income, t+1 / Segment Sales, t+1. 
ROS T, t-1—return on sales of a target one year before the acquisition, calculated as  
ROS T, t-1 = Target Net Income, t-1/ Target Sales, t-1. 
Prior to the calculation of target ROA and ROS development (TPROA and TPROS), some 
segments’ and targets’ individual net income, assets, and sales had to be joined to avoid double 
entries of data. Where a bidder acquired several targets in one year and placed them into one 
segment, these targets’ net income, sales, or assets were combined as if one company was acquired 
instead of two. There were five such cases with two targets placed into one segment. The opposite 
situation also occurred, where the assets of one target were spread among several segments. The 
individual financials of such segments were also added up as if one target was placed in one 
segment. There were four of such cases.  
Independent Variables  
The data for the acquirer’s CEO compensation variables was obtained from COMPUSTAT 
Executive Compensation Data (Wharton Research Data Services, the Wharton School, University 
of Pennsylvania). 
1. Acquirer CEO compensation has several measures: 
Percentage change of the base salary (cash and non-cash) earned by the acquirer’s CEO during 
the fiscal year in which the acquisition took place, compared to the previous year salary. 
Percentage change of the total compensation for the fiscal year in which the deal was completed. 
Total compensation comprises the following: salary, bonus, total value of restricted stock granted, 
total value of stock options granted, long-term incentive payouts, and all other material benefits 
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that can be classified as compensation. 
Following the research of Devers et al. (2013) and Malmendier and Tate (2005), I distinguish 
between CEO’ total compensation and CEO’s total compensation, including exercised options. 
Devers et al. (2013) argue that CEOs may not expect post-acquisition performance improvement 
as they exercise their options before merger and sell them around the acquisition announcement 
date. Conversely, Malmendier and Tate (2005) insist that top managers holding large portions of 
unexercised options are overconfident in the future profits of their firms. Therefore, I add the 
following measure of CEO compensation. 
Percentage change of the total compensation, including exercised options for the fiscal year in 
which the deal was completed. Total compensation comprises the following: salary, bonus, total 
value of restricted stock granted, net value of stock options exercised, long-term incentive payouts, 
and all other material benefits. In this measure, the total value of stock options granted from the 
previous variable was replaced by the net value of stock options exercised.  
Stock awards is a dummy variable, where 1 represents the situation where an acquirer’s CEO was 
granted stock awards for the fiscal year in which the deal was completed and 0 where a CEO was 
not awarded company stocks.  
2. CEO ownership is assessed by the percentage of shares held by the chief executive at the year 
end in which the acquisition was completed. The variable has two variations: CEO’s total 
ownership and CEO’s total ownership excluding stock options. 
Missing values for the CEO ownership were substantial (n=27) due to the reporting constraints. If 
CEOs hold below 1% of the corporate equity, companies are allowed not to report their share. 
CEO’s total ownership is turned to categorical for some types of analysis. Thus, the supplementary 
variable takes two levels of ownership: less than 1% and more than 1% of the total corporate 
equity.  
3. Target size has two measures. One is the target’s total assets divided by the segment’s total 




4.  Level of relatedness between a target and acquirer is measured by comparing the 4-digit SIC 
codes. Servaes (1996) argues that industry differentiation by 4-digit SIC codes may be too broad 
and misleading. He suggests measuring relatedness by the equal first two digits of a SIC code, 
which indicates the major industry group. Although Servaes’ (1996) approach would be a better 
option, our samples do not have a significant degree of diversification between target and acquirer 
(Table 2). All target-acquirer industries share the same first two digits of a SIC code. Therefore, 
target unrelatedness means that target and acquirer businesses differ at the industry group level but 
in general belong to the same major industry. This type of unrelatedness can be denoted as a 
moderate diversification.   
Business relatedness is a dummy variable, corresponding to 1 if a target and acquirer share similar 
SIC codes (all four digits). All other combinations, including those where the first two digits are 
identical, correspond to 0 (Table 2).  
Table 2: Business relatedness between target and acquirer 
Relatedness by 
All 4 digits of SIC 




Unrelated, code 0 58 51.33 58 51.33 
Related, code 1 55 48.67 113 100.00 
 
Control variables  
To control for industry-specific effects the following two variables are created: Year mean industry 
difference in ROA and Year mean industry difference in ROS.  
Year mean industry difference in ROA(ROS) represents the difference between segment mean 
industry profitability (ROA or ROS) and target mean industry profitability one year post-
acquisition. First, the data is sorted by year then by segment(target) industries. The mean 
segment(target) ROA(ROS) difference is calculated for each industry for the same year, omitting 
the observation of interest.  
These variables are meant to control for industry-specific operating returns in a particular year 




Descriptive Statistics  
The sample includes 113 target-segment combinations. In this dataset, the target after being 
acquired was placed in the existing segment(s) of the acquirer. I start by presenting some distinct 
features and descriptive statistics about the sample and measures of the data  
Industries of acquirers and targets 
The industries of both targets and acquirers are not evenly represented across the sample, as we 
can see in Table 1 and Table 2 (Appendix A). Acquirers operate in 25 industry sectors, while 
targets are spread over 24 industries. Such industries as Drugs and Electronic and Electrical 
Equipment are represented by 14 targets each. Among the acquirers, 15 companies operate in the 
Drugs industry and 17 in the Electronic and Electrical Equipment industry.  
Target size 
Acquirers from our data chose relatively small targets. Most of the targets constituted less than a 
third of the bidders’ segment sales or assets (Table 3a and Table 3b). The small relative size of the 
targets may reduce the proposed performance effect. Conversely, targets could be bought for 
reasons beyond their physical assets or market share, like technology, marketing capabilities, or 
unique expertise. In this case the size of a target may not be the key factor affecting target post-
acquisition performance.   
 
Table 3a: Target sales compared to the acquirer segment(s) sales 
Target Sales to 
Acquirer Sales 




0.33 or less 82 72.57 82 72.57 
0.33 to 0.66] 22 19.47 104 92.04 







Table 3b: Target assets compared to the acquirer segment(s) assets 
Target Assets 
to Acquirer Assets 




0.33 or less 92 81.42 92 81.42 
0.33 to 0.66] 14 12.39 106 93.81 
more than 0.66 7 6.19 113 100 
 
Year of acquisition 
During the sample period there was no substantial difference in the number of acquisitions made 
in a specific year (Table 4). However, in 2007-2008 companies were more active in M&A, which 
is in line with the recorded boom of takeovers in that period. These two years account for 39 
acquisitions out of 113 in our sample. It corresponds to 34.51% of all observations.  
Table 4: Number of mergers and acquisitions by year (2006-2013) 






2006 13 11.50 13 11.50 
2007 18 15.93 31 27.43 
2008 21 18.58 52 46.02 
2009 14 12.39 66 58.41 
2010 14 12.39 80 70.80 
2011 8 7.08 88 77.88 
2012 12 10.62 100 88.50 
2013 13 11.50 113 100.00 
 
Frequency of acquisitions 
Some companies are frequent buyers who often make more than one acquisition per year. 
Laamanen and Keil (2008) point out that the greater the number of acquisitions made per year, the 
greater the chances the company will show a decrease in ROA and market returns. The work of 
Aktas, Bodt, and Roll (2009) also argues that cumulative abnormal returns decline with each 
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subsequent acquisition. In our sample, most companies made only one acquisition during 2006-
2013 (Table 5) and thus frequent buyer issues were not observed.  
 
Table 5: Number of acquisitions made by each acquirer during 2006-2013 (n=113) 
Number of 
Acquisitions 




1 76 84.44 76 84.44 
2 9 10.00 85 94.44 
3 2 2.22 87 96.67 
4 2 2.22 89 98.89 
5 1 1.11 90 100.00 
 
CEO ownership 
The sample does not have high levels of CEO ownership in the firm. The maximum CEO’s stake 
is 9.741 % while the minimum is hardly 0.001% (Table 6). The mean CEO’s total ownership of 
the firm is 1.756% (median 1.021%), while for CEO’s total ownership excluding stock options, 
the mean is lower and equals 1.011% (median 0.36%).  The two groups: less and more than 1% of 
CEO ownership of the firm, were created out of the CEO total ownership variable. The 1% cut-
off point is arbitrary and based on the sample characteristic. The two groups are equally distributed 
with 38 observations in each. As pointed out above, many corporations have chosen not to report 
the exact ownership level if it is less than 1%, which accounts for 28 missing values in the final 
sample.  




N Mean, % Median, % Min, % Max, % 
Under 1% 38 0.2651 0.1860 0.001 1 




Mean target ROA/ROS development  
To analyze post acquisition operating performance, ROA and ROS of segment(s) were compared 
to targets’ pre-merger ROA and ROS. Mean target ROA and ROS development showed an 
increase in values. Segment(s) that merged with targets after the deal reported an average ROA of 
0.02 (median 0.03) and ROS of 0.03 (median 0.04). Compared with pre-merger ROA and ROS, 
target profitability inside an acquirer’s segment improved substantially by 0.16 points on average 
in ROA (median 0.02) and 0.39 points in ROS (median 0.03). A large difference between mean 
and median values suggests the presence of outlying observations.  
After removing erroneous and extreme observations (described further), average target ROA has 
increased by 0.08 points (median 0.02), while ROS by 0.18 points (median 0.03). From the rise in 
post-acquisition mean performance indicators, it can be concluded that targets’ operations have 
improved. However, the cause of improvement may lie in a tendency of some targets in the sample 
to underperform.  On average, targets reported ROA of -0.06 (median 0.02) and ROS of -0.14 
(median 0.01) one year prior to the acquisition deals.  
Analysis of Variance 
Tests of the difference in means among two or several groups were run to identify whether target 
performance ROA(ROS) varied for related targets, for higher levels of CEO ownership, or for 
stock-based compensated CEOs. Further paired comparison tests identified whether target 
(segment) performance actually changed after the M&A deal. 
According to the normality test, post-acquisition target performance (TPROA and TPROS) and 
percentage change in CEO compensation (base salary, total compensation and total compensation 
including exercised options) are not normally distributed. Therefore, the Wilcoxon rank sum test 
is a reference test rather than t-test.  
The results presented in Table 7 below show that there is no significant difference in post-
acquisition target performance (either ROA or ROS development) between related and unrelated 
targets. In other words, Hypothesis 3a, which proposed that unrelated targets do worse after being 











Target Relatedness:   
Unrelated 0.0946 0.2145 
Related 0.0707 0.1510 
Difference in means (t-test) 0.48 0.47 
Wilcoxon rank sum test (z-statistic) 0.6205 1.1398 
Number of companies 102 100 
* Statistically significant at 1% level. ** Statistically significant at 5% level. *** Statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
In addition, acquisition of unrelated business does not lead to higher CEO remuneration according 
to our data. The year-to-year change in CEO’s base salary, total compensation and total 
compensation including exercised options is almost the same for diversifying and non-diversifying 
CEOs (Table 8).  















Target Relatedness:     
Unrelated 4.9105 21.0665 47.1629 
Related 9.8098 26.3948 61.5602 
Difference in means (t-test) -0.90 -0.41 -0.35 
Wilcoxon rank sum test (z-statistic) -1.4014 -0.489 0.8023 
Number of companies 97 96 95 
 
I anticipate that CEO ownership and stock-based compensation have a positive impact on post-
acquisition target performance. According to the Wilcoxon rank sum test, the presence of stock-
based rewards impacts only TPROS. With a p-value <0.093 for a two-sided z-test, we can be 90% 
confident that CEOs receiving stock awards do better in terms of return on target sales 





Table 9: Difference in target performance depending on the presence of stock-based 
compensation 
 
Target ROA development 
(TPROA) 
Target ROS development 
(TPROS) 
Stock-based compensation:   
Not present 0.0494 0.0711 
Present 0.0908 0.2120 
Difference in means (t-test) -0.7 -0.85 
Wilcoxon rank sum test (z-statistic) -1.5775 -1.6791*** 
Number of companies 102 100 
* Statistically significant at 1% level. ** Statistically significant at 5% level. *** Statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
There is also a difference in post-acquisition target operating returns depending on the two groups 
of CEO ownership. The difference in the Wilcoxon rank sums between the CEOs holding more 
1% and less than 1% of firms’ stock is significant at 99% confidence (Table 10). 
Table 10: Difference in target performance depending on CEO ownership level 
 
Target ROA development 
(TPROA) 
Target ROS development 
(TPROS) 
CEO ownership:   
More than 1%, n=38 0.0198 0.0361 
Under 1%, n=38(37) 0.1227 0.3509 
Difference in means (t-test) -1.81*** -1.8*** 
Wilcoxon rank sum test (z-statistic) -2.8517* 3.222* 
Number of companies 76 75 
* Statistically significant at 1% level. ** Statistically significant at 5% level. *** Statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
The larger the target size compared to the acquirer, the greater influence it should have on the 
financial result of a segment. To differentiate the effect of target size, the following groups were 
formed: less than 0.33% of an acquirer’s sales (assets), greater than 0.33% but below 0.66%, 










Target ROS development 
(TPROS) 
Target Size by Sales:   
less than 0.33], n=70 0.1109 0.2268 
0.33-0.66], n=22 -0.0042 0.0736 
more than 0.66, n=8 0.0526 0.0576 
Difference in means (F-test) 1.9295 0.5313 
Kruskal-Wallis test, Chi-Square 5.4886*** 8.3698** 
Target Size by Assets:   
less than 0.33], n=79 0.0949 0.1925 
0.33-0.66], n=14 0.0049 0.1277 
more than 0.66, n=4 0.0742 0.11508 
Difference in means (F-test) 0.7861 0.0727 
Kruskal-Wallis test, chi-square 5.2577*** 4.6208*** 
Number of companies 102 100 
* Statistically significant at 1% level. ** Statistically significant at 5% level. *** Statistically significant at 10% 
level. 
 
A change in post-acquisition ROA and ROS development varies depending on the size of target 
assets or sales compared to the acquirer. With corresponding p-values ranging from < 0.0152 to   
<0.0992, we have enough evidence to reject the null hypotheses that target performance medians 
are identical for all Target Size by Assets and Target Size by Sales groups (Table 11).     
As the analysis shows, target size impacts post-acquisition returns, but does not affect executive 
remuneration. According to the Kruskal-Wallis test, there is no significant difference in acquirer’s 
CEO base salary, total compensation and total compensation including exercised options 






















Target Size by Sales:    
less than 0.33], n=70 5.0419 20.9176 69.497 
0.33-0.66], n=22 15.6227 44.3488 23.26 
more than 0.66, n=8 6.9071 -1.2391 11.655 
Difference in means (F-test) 1.2544 1.7989 0.6183 
Kruskal-Wallis test, Chi-Square 0.109 3.9996 0.2524 
Target Size by Assets:    
less than 0.33], n=79 4.8877 21.2931 61.8171 
0.33-0.66], n=14 20.6498 40.3701 31.3023 
more than 0.66, n=4 11.1694 22.758 9.578 
Difference in means (F-test) 2.1447 0.5072 0.264 
Kruskal-Wallis test, chi-square 2.022 0.5433 0.5361 
Number of companies 97 96 95 
* Statistically significant at 1% level. ** Statistically significant at 5% level. *** Statistically significant at 10% 
level. 
 
Paired comparisons of target ROA (ROS) one year before the acquisition and segment ROA (ROS) 
one year after 
As mentioned in the literature review, many scholars have inquired as to whether post-acquisition 
performance of acquirers improves after a merger. Very few among them have analysed target 
operating results. Unfortunately, our type of data does not allow us to compare target income 
directly before and after the acquisition, but it is possible to compare ROA and ROS of a target 
and segment. Paired comparisons of ROA and ROS demonstrate that there is a significant 
difference between the ROA and ROS of a target and segment with a 95-99% confidence level 





Table 13: Paired comparisons of mean target performance before and after the acquisition 
  Mean ROA Mean ROS  
Performance:   
Target (Before) -0.0557 -0.1438 
Target with Segment (After)  0.0257 0.0345 
Paired mean difference 0.0815 0.1796 
Paired Comparisons (t-test) 3.32* 2.57** 
Sign (M) 10** 18* 
Wilcoxon signed rank test (S) 803.5* 1018* 
Number of companies 102 100 
* Statistically significant at 1% level. ** Statistically significant at 5% level. *** Statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
Multiple Linear Regressions  
According to the cross-correlation matrix (Appendix 1, Table 3), there is no unexpectedly strong 
relationships among the independent variables. The two dependent variables (target performance 
ROA and ROS development) are positively correlated (r=0.51) and the relationship is significant. 
Mean industry performance variables for ROA and ROS are moderately correlated with each of 
the performance variables and with each other. The two control variables for the size of a target 
compared to the acquirer by assets and by sales are also strongly related (r =0.83). The variables 
mentioned are not supposed to enter the same regression model. So, high correlations among some 
of the effects do not cause concerns. 
Top executives’ compensation variables, namely CEO’s base salary percentage change, CEO’s 
total compensation percentage change and CEO’s total compensation including exercised options 
percentage change also have small to medium correlations among them. Except for the base salary, 
total remuneration often implies stock-related awards that can interfere with the effects of CEO 
ownership. Therefore, each of the three executive compensation variables and each of two 
ownership measures were associated with either target ROA or ROS development (TPROA and 
TPROS) using multiple linear regression models.  
The variance inflation factor is not higher than two, indicating that multi-collinearity does not 





Table 14:  Multiple linear regression results 
Dependent Variables TPROA (Target ROA development) TPROS (Target ROS development) 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  
Intercept -0.0213 -0.0182 0.0185 -0.3369 -0.3492 -0.2742 
Controls       
Target size by assets (ln) -0.0232 -0.0239 -0.0202 - - - 
Mean industry ROA by 
year1 0.3392** 0.3606** 0.3072** - - - 
Target size by sales(log) - - - 0.2192*** -0.211*** -0.2138 
Mean industry ROS by year2 - - - 0.8911** 0.9289** 0.8487** 
Main Effects       
Target Relatedness dummy 0.0093 0.0225 0.0096 0.0424 -0.0072 0.0475 
CEO total Compensation, % 
change - -0.0005 - - 0.002 - 
CEO total ownership, % - - -0.019*** - - -0.0326*** 
R-Square 0.1337 0.1475 0.1638 0.2958 0.3175 0.3037 
Adj R-Sq 0.0937 0.0942 0.1115 0.2628 0.2741 0.2594 
F-value 3.34** 2.77** 3.13** 8.96* 7.33* 6.87* 
N  104 98 69 99 93 69 
* Statistically significant at 1% level. ** Statistically significant at 5% level. *** Statistically significant at 10% level; n=69 
First, only the effect of control variables and business relatedness on the TPROA and TPROS 
development were estimated (Model 1 and Model 4 in Table 14). Industry per year controls 
appeared to affect both target performance estimators. Target size by the amount of sales can be 
seen to have a significant negative effect on the post-acquisition ROS development. With 90% 
confidence TPROS would decrease by -0.21 with each 1-point increase in target’s size (Model 4 
and model 5 in Table 14). This effect probably occurred due to the fact that in our sample larger 
targets were underperforming prior to the acquisition (Table 11) and therefore jeopardized their 
segments’ operations. 
Adding one of the effect variables, CEO’s total compensation, reveals that its effect on post 
acquisition target ROA/ROS development is not significant (Model 2 and Model 3). The repetition 
of the same model but with CEO’s base salary or total compensation including exercised options 
produces identical results— we do not have enough evidence to assert that the effect of CEO 
compensation on target ROA/ROS development is different from zero.  Therefore, Hypothesis 1 
claiming no relationship between CEO’s compensation growth and post-acquisition target 
                                                             
1 Mean ROA change by industry is calculated for the year that follows the acquisition year. 
2 Mean ROS change by industry is calculated for the year that follows the acquisition year. 
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performance is supported. Since Hypothesis 1 involves null hypothesis, I followed a procedure 
suggested by Cohen (1992). To test the no-significant impact of CEO’s total compensation growth 
on target post-acquisition performance I used a multiple linear regression with 3 independent 
variables: target size by assets/sales, mean industry ROA/ROS by year and CEO total 
compensation change (the regressions are run separately and not presented in Table 14).  To find 
a minimum sample size to test a null, I found that the assumed effect size will be large for both 
TPROA and TPROS regressions (R square for TPROA=0.2443; R square for TPROS=0.3028), further 
the desired power of the test is 0.95 (α=0.05 and β=0.05) then with 3 independent variables for 
each regression, the minimum sample size to be able to conclude that no significant effect exists 
is n=34 for each of the regressions (Cohen, 1992, p.157,158). Since, our sample size for both 
regressions (n=98 for TPROA and n=93 for TPROS) exceeds the required minimum size, the null 
hypothesis 1 can be supported at β =0.05.  
The presence of stock-based awards in the executive compensation did not improve post-
acquisition target ROA and ROS development. The regression models with stock awards dummy 
are not shown in the presented tables.  
CEO’s total ownership, on the other hand, demonstrated a significant relation with target ROA 
and ROS development one year post-acquisition with 90% confidence for both (Model 3 and 
Model 6 in Table 14). However, the relation is in an unexpected, negative direction. The replication 
of the same regression models but with CEO’s total ownership excluding stock options produces 
the same negative sign but in this case the estimates become insignificant for either TPROA or 
TPROS (the results are not shown). CEO ownership is shown to affect post-acquisition target 
performance, but the effect is opposite to the proposed one. With each 1% increase in CEO’s stock 
ownership, target operating performance decreases by 0.02 points for TPROA and 0.03 for 
TPROS, holding the other variables constant.  
The CEOs’ preferences for prior underperforming targets may explain the observed trend. CEOs 
with higher stakes might have seen unrealized opportunities in the underperforming targets which 
have pulled down the profitability ratios in a short term. However, the Wilcoxon rank sums test 




Table 15: Difference in target ROA and ROS prior to merger for two levels of acquirer’s 
CEO ownership 
 
Mean target ROA  
before the deal  
Mean target ROS  
before the deal  
CEO total ownership:   
More than 1%, n=38 -0.015 -0.0433 
Under 1%, n=38(37) -0.089 -0.2891 
Difference in means (t-test) 1.28 1.47 
Wilcoxon rank sum test (z-statistic) 1.8024*** -2.289** 
Number of companies 76 75 
* Statistically significant at 1% level. ** Statistically significant at 5% level. *** Statistically significant at 10% level;  
In addition, I account for prior target underperformance for the regression models, presented in 
Table 14. Controlling for target losses one year before the deal closure (a dummy variable 
indicating 1 if target has had a negative Net Income one year prior the acquisition) has a significant 
positive effect on target post-acquisition ROA/ROS development, however the negative sign for 
the CEO ownership measures remain unchanged. Further, to test if target performance changes 
with different levels of stocks hold, CEO ownership is turned into a categorical variable (Model 1 
and Model 2 in Table 16). The variable is divided into two groups: more than 1% and less than 1% 
of the total equity hold by the firm CEOs. The results show that target ROA and ROS development 
do not change if CEO controlling power exceeds 1%. 
Table 16:  Multiple linear regression results for CEOs holding more than 1% of ownership 
Dependent Variables 
TPROA (Target ROA 
development) 
TPROS (Target ROS 
development) 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -0.0135 -0.2196 
Controls   
Target size by assets (ln) -0.027 - 
Mean industry ROA by year -0.4193* - 
Target size by sales(log) - -0.1973* 
Mean Industry ROS by year - 0.8284** 
Main Effects   
Target Relatedness  0.0389 0.0439 
CEO ownership, more 
than 1 % -0.0616 -0.1449 
Adj R-Sq 0.2114 0.2863 
F-value 4.76* 7.02* 





In Table 16, the effect of higher (in terms of our sample) ownership level is not significant for 
TPROA and TPROS, meaning that in the post-acquisition period, CEO ownership of 1% and 
above is not a plausible reason for target performance improvement. 
Another explanation for the negative effect of CEO ownership on target performance can be 
borrowed from the results obtained by Morck et al. (1988). Later Hubbard & Palia (1995) came to 
the same conclusions but in the context of mergers and acquisitions. Morck et al. (1988) proved 
empirically that at lower levels of managerial ownership (0%-5%) firm value rises. Starting from 
5% of the equity holding, managers become more confident in their employment and less value-
maximizing, which causes market returns (and operating profits) to decline.  
To test this argument, I created two dummies from the CEO total ownership variable similar to 
the specifications of Morck et al., (1988). However, the ownership ranges of 0-5%, 5-25%, and 
over 25% used in the aforementioned two studies were not possible to follow due to small 
ownership stakes in our sample, where only seven cases of equity holdings were over 5%. In our 
sample, the maximum CEO ownership is 9.741%, which is far lower than 25%. Therefore, I 
defined ownership ranges of below 1% and above 1%.  
The new variables would be the following: 
OWN0to1         = CEO total ownership if CEO total ownership < 1%; 
        = 1% if CEO total ownership > = 1%; 
 
OWN1to10       = 0 if CEO total ownership < 1%; 
        = CEO total ownership –1% if CEO total ownership > = 1%; 
 
The piecewise (segmented) regressions for TPROA and TPROS would be the following: 
TPROA=Intercept – 0.1465**OWN0to1+0.0163 OWN1to10 +0.42** Mean industry ROA by 
year+ 0.0446 Relatedness - 0.0259 Size by assets(log); 
F=4.41*, R squared=0.2397, R squared adj. =0.1854; 
TPROS=Intercept – 0.2637***OWN0to1+0.0154 OWN1to10 +0.8612**Mean industry ROS by 
year+ 0.0545 Relatedness - 0.1938 Size by sales(log); 
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F=5.72*, R squared=0.2929, R squared adj. =0.2417; 
* Statistically significant at 1% level. ** Statistically significant at 5% level. *** Statistically significant at 10% level. 
We observe that managerial holdings below 1% have a negative impact on post-acquisition target 
performance. Where CEO ownership level rises by 0.1%, target ROA development declines by 
0.015 points and target ROS by 0.026 with 95% and 90% confidence intervals.  
The same analysis was repeated for CEO ownership excluding stock options. The new piecewise 
regressions keep the same signs, negative for 0-1% ownership and positive for over 1%, however 
both effects become insignificant.  
Target relatedness 
Widely discussed in research, target relatedness does not have any association with either target 
performance measures, TPROA or TPROS (Tables 14 and 16).  
To test whether performance of dissimilar targets improved with the growth of CEO ownership, 
the dummy variable was reversed to indicate 1 if the target was unrelated. Also, an interaction term 
of unrelated target and CEO ownership excluding stock options enters the model. The term is 
significant at 90% confidence only for the change in ROA, but with unexpected negative effects. 
Post-acquisition ROA development of unrelated targets drops 0.01 points with a 1% increase in 
CEO ownership (Table 17, Model 2). Repeating the same regression but with CEO total ownership 
instead of CEO ownership excluding stock options yields a very similar result (Table 17, Model 
3).  
For the progress in TPROS for unrelated targets, the evidence suggests a somewhat different 
situation. Holding the other effects constant, we can be 99% confident that post-acquisition change 
in ROS would be higher for unrelated targets (Table 17, Models 4-6). Therefore, hypothesis 3a 
claiming that dissimilar targets do worse is not supported across the presented models. Unrelated 
targets could be in worse financial situation preceding the merger, making room for gradual 
improvement inside the acquirer’s segment. However, the analysis does not allow us to conclude 
that there was any difference in TPROA or TPROS for unrelated targets compared to related ones 
prior to the acquisition (the results are not shown). 
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In Model 6 (Table 17), a combination of CEO’s total ownership and target unrelatedness provides 
a significant negative effect (β= -0.0776**). The identical model but with CEO’s total ownership 
excluding stock options (Model 5 in Table 17) does not have the effect of the equal strength (β= -
0.0902). In TPROS models, the negative influence described is offset by a positive and significant 
impact of the fact that the target is unrelated (β=0.2378* and β=0.2826* in Table 17, Models 5 and 
6). The regressions with CEO total ownership (includes stock options) are not shown.   
Table 17: Multiple linear regression results for the CEO ownership effect on performance 
of unrelated targets 
Dependent Variables TPROA (Target ROA development) TPROS (Target ROS development) 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5  Model 6 
Intercept -0.0350 -0.0314 -0.0203 0.0647 0.0367 0.0291 
Controls       
Target size by assets(log) -0.0321*** -0.0258 -0.0212 - - - 
Mean industry ROA by 
year 0.4409** 0.4218** 0.423** - - - 
Target size by sales(log) - - - -0.1030 -0.0806 -0.0715 
Mean industry ROS by 
year - - - 0.5765 0.6119 0.6093 
Main Effects       
Target Unrelatedness 
dummy -0.0352 0.0221 0.0543 0.1541*** 0.2378* 0.2826* 
CEO ownership excl. 
Stock options, %  0.0136 0.0249 - -0.0039 0.0158 - 
Interaction of CEO 
ownership and target 
unrelatedness3 - -0.0581*** - - -0.0902 - 
CEO total ownership, % - - 0.0153 - - 0.0124 
Interaction of CEO total 
ownership and target 
unrelatedness4 - - -0.0523*** - - -0.0776** 
R-Square 0.2061 0.2327 0.2451 0.1261 0.1517 0.1725 
Adj R-Sq 0.1614 0.1779 0.1912 0.0754 0.0893 0.1116 
F-value 4.61* 4.25* 4.55* 2.49** 2.43** 2.83** 
* Statistically significant at 1% level. ** Statistically significant at 5% level. *** Statistically significant at 10% level; n=75 
 
In summary, Hypothesis 3b, which proposes an increase in target ROA/ROS development for 
                                                             
3 An interaction term of target unrelatedness and CEO ownership excluding stock options  
4 An interaction term of target unrelatedness and CEO total ownership  
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unrelated targets with the rise of an acquirer’s CEO ownership, can not be confirmed with the 
available data.  
The findings discussed up to here are based on the development of target operating performance 
after the acquisition. Since the bidders allocate the targets into existing segments, it might be 
worthwhile to also track the performance of these segments. The analysis of segment performance 
in the year of acquisition and one year after can add to the validity of the main study as a robustness 
check.  
 
Post-Acquisition Segment Performance. A Robustness Check. 
Segment performance data was derived from the same manually confirmed sample. Only those 
segments to which targets were allocated were considered. In robustness sample the response 
variables were changed to compare segments’ performance one year post-acquisition with the 
performance of the same segments one year before (Figure 2). The robustness sample comprises 
only 59 observations, mainly because of the missing data for the segments reporting items: net 








Figure 2:  Segment performance before and after the acquisition date 
All of the targets that were added to the segments were related based on a 4-digit SIC code. This 
sample also has the extreme CEO compensation values (n=6) that are influential for the results. 
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Segment ROA, ROS in 
the year of the merger, 
at (t) 
  
Segment ROA, ROS one 
year after the merger, at 
(t+1) 
 
Target exists as a separate 
entity 
Target joins a specific 
segment within the acquirer 
Main sample 
Dependent variables. 








For the outliers, either CEO’s total compensation or CEO’s total compensation including exercised 
options grew on a year-to-year basis from 333.52% to 1564.97%. In addition, two entries of 
extreme CEO ownership levels, representing 25.65% and 58.1% of total equity were also removed 
as they were too critical for this sample. 
The dependent variables are calculated in the same way as in the main sample. Segment 
performance development is a difference between segment ROA/ROS one year after the 
acquisition and segment ROA/ROS for the year of acquisition.  
1. Segment ROA development (SPROA) is a change of segment ROA after the acquisition. 
SPROA= ROA s, t+1 –ROA s, t; where  
t—is the year of acquisition; 
t+1 –is the year following the year of acquisition. 
2. Segment ROS development (SPROS) is a change of segment ROS after the acquisition. 
SPROS= ROS s, t+1 –ROS s, t;  
Independent variables are calculated in the same way as for the main sample. 
 
Descriptive statistics and multiple linear regression results for the robustness sample 
On average, segments’ ROA slightly decreased from 0.0075 (median 0.039) at the end of the deal 
year to 0.0065 (median 0.043) one year later. Since median return-on-assets shows the opposite, 
we may conclude that only several segments’ financials deteriorated and moved the mean to the 
left.  On the return-on-sales side, there was an improvement in average ratios from ROS equalling           
-0.0009 (median 0.0441) for the year of the deal to 0.0128 (median 0.0651) one year later.  
Nevertheless, paired test on mean differences has shown no significant shifts in performance 





Table 18: Panel B Sample. Paired comparisons of mean segment ROA and ROS 
 Mean Segment ROA Mean Segment ROS 
Segment performance:   
Before 5 0.0075 -0.0009 
After 6 0.0065 0.0128 
Paired mean difference -0.0009 0.0137 
Paired Comparisons (t-test) -0.4 0.25 
Sign (M) 3.5 7.5** 
Wilcoxon signed rank test (S) 108 254** 
Number of companies 58 58 
* Statistically significant at 1% level. ** Statistically significant at 5% level. *** Statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
Several propositions mentioned in the first part of the paper discussed the role of CEO ownership 
and ownership-related compensation relative to post-acquisition target performance. Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test shows that presence of stock awards does not cause a change in segment ROA/ROS 
development. The same is true for the two levels of CEO ownership in the bidding firm (Table 19 
and Table 20). Both conclusions are in line with the results obtained from the main sample. 
 
Table 19: Difference in segment performance depending on the presence of stock-based 
compensation 





Stock-based compensation:   
Present 0.0195 0.0563 
Not present -0.0085 -0.0021 
Difference in means (t-test) 0.54 0.48 
Wilcoxon rank sum test (z-statistic) -0.4177 -0.5712 
Number of companies 58 59 
* Statistically significant at 1% level. ** Statistically significant at the 5% level. *** Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
                                                             
5  Before means at the end of the year of acquisition. 




Table 20: Difference in segment performance depending on CEO ownership level 





CEO ownership:   
More than 1% -0.0545 -0.0219 
Under 1%] 0.0165 0.0259 
Difference in means (t-test) -1.28 -0.37 
Wilcoxon rank sum test (z-statistic) 0.3615 0.38 
Number of companies 57 57 
* Statistically significant at 1% level. ** Statistically significant at the 5% level. *** Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
Multiple linear regression was used to assess the association between upper echelon compensation 
and segment performance improvements (Table 21). Close to the outcomes received with the main 
sample, CEO compensation does not affect segment ROA/ROS development. In addition, the 
negative sign of the relation persists with the robustness sample as well.  
 
Table 21:  Multiple linear regression results for segment performance 
Dependent Variables 
SPROA (Segment ROA 
development) 
SPROS (Segment ROS 
development) 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 4 
Intercept 0.0256 0.1033** 
Controls   
Mean industry ROA by 
year7 0.078 - 
Mean industry ROS by year8 - -0.0406 
Main Effects   
CEO Base salary, % change -0.0008 -0.0048 
R-Square 0.0959 0.3239 
Adj R-Sq 0.0597 0.2968 
F-value 2.65** 11.98* 
* Statistically significant at 1% level. ** Statistically significant at 5% level. *** Statistically significant at 10% level; n=53. 
Unfortunately, missing values for CEO total ownership in this data did not allow us to run multiple 
                                                             
7 Mean ROA change by industry is calculated for the year that follows the acquisition year. 
8 Mean ROS change by industry is calculated for the year that follows the acquisition year. 
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linear regressions to confirm the previous findings.  
Relying on the robustness analysis, the remuneration of top executives demonstrated no influence 
on the progress of segment financials. Concurrent with the previous results, the presence of stock-
based compensation (Table 19) and the level of CEO ownership (Table 20) did not make noticeable 
changes in segment ROA/ROS development. However, unlike the targets from the main sample, 
segments were not underperforming in the year of acquisition, nor could a significant shift in 





This study seeks to identify how the CEO’s motivations behind undertaking an acquisition impact 
post-merger target performance. I proposed motivations such as the growth of CEO compensation 
and the acquisition of unrelated target to secure a managerial job, would negligibly and negatively 
affect target operating performance. I also hypothesized that the level of CEO ownership would 
have a positive impact on target performance. To test these propositions, I analyzed a sample of 
113 public targets acquired between 2006–2013. The descriptive analysis of this sample has 
highlighted several noteworthy characteristics.  
The results show that almost half (approximately 46 %) of the targets underperformed compared 
to prior to the merger. The average of the target firm’s ROA one year before the deal was -0.06 
whilst ROS was even lower, at -0.14. In addition, the bidders preferred relatively small targets: 
over 70% of the purchased firms were three times smaller than their segments, with target size 
being determined by amount of sales or assets. According to the data, all targets share the first 2-
digits of the 4-digit SIC code with acquirers, meaning that conglomerate mergers are not present 
in our sample. 
CEO Motivations for Greater Compensation and Post-Acquisition Target Performance 
Based on prior research, several propositions were made regarding the impact of CEO 
compensation year-to-year percentage growth on target operating performance. I expected that the 
compensation that the CEO of the acquiring company receives after the deal’s completion does 
not motivate them to attain higher post-merger profits.  
On average, CEO’s base salary increased by 7.48% in the year of acquisition. Likewise, CEO’s 
total compensation increased by 23.95%, while CEO’s total compensation including exercised 
options increased by 54.89%. Nevertheless, a multiple linear regression analysis showed that an 
increase in CEO wealth (defined by their total compensation) was not associated with the target 
ROA and ROS development. Thus, the proposition that acquiring CEO compensation has no 
relation to post-acquisition target performance can be supported based on the two samples (the 




According to the Wilcoxon rank sum test, the presence of stock-based rewards impacts only a 
change in target ROS. We can be 90% confident that CEOs receiving stock awards do better in 
terms of return on target sales development. However, no change was observed regarding the 
return-on-assets ratio. Also, no significant relationship between SBC and target post-acquisition 
development was observed in the regression models. However, stock-based compensation leads to 
a higher level of CEO ownership, which may theoretically have a positive effect on target operating 
results. 
CEO Ownership and Post-Acquisition Target Performance 
In contradiction with hypothesis 2a, I did not observe a positive effect of CEO total ownership on 
target ROA (TPROA) and ROS (TPROS) development that was anticipated. For each 1% increase 
in CEO total ownership in the firm, there was, on average, a 0.02-point decrease in target TPROA 
and a 0.03-point decrease in target TPROS. This negative trend seems not to result from the risky 
behaviour on the part of the managers acquiring underperforming targets. Rather, CEOs with 
stakes higher than 1% were acquiring relatively profitable firms. Interestingly, when CEO total 
ownership is replaced with CEO’s total ownership excluding stock options (another measure of 
ownership) the relationship becomes insignificant, though the negative trend persists.  
Several studies have mentioned that the impact of CEO equity holdings on firm performance is 
not monotonic (Morck et al.,1988; Hubbard & Palia1995). For example, Morck et al. (1988) 
showed that at low levels of managerial ownership (0–5%) a firm’s market value (Tobin’s Q) rises. 
However, starting from 5%, it declines before slowly rising again as CEOs accumulate over 25% 
of stock. Initially, firm stocks motivate executives to perform (goal alignment effect), but once 
reaching a certain point (over 5%) managers gain voting power to overcome the internal controls 
and make less value-optimizing decisions (managerial entrenchment effect).   
To test the above rationale, I followed Morck et al.’s (1988) approach and ran a piecewise 
(segmented) linear regression. A significant negative impact was observed at low levels of CEO 
ownership (below 1%) on post-acquisition target ROA and ROS development with β- coefficients 
equal to -0.1465** and -0.2637***, respectively. For ownership levels above 1%, the impact was 
insignificant but positive. This discrepancy of results can be explained by the different ownership 
ranges and dependent variables used in this study compared to others. For example, Morck et al. 
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(1988) used different ownership ranges (0-5%, 5-25% and over 25%) and Tobin’s Q as a dependant 
variable. In addition, their data was based on one-year (1980) of stock returns and had no 
connection to M&A. Although the study of Hubbard and Palia (1995) focused on an M&A context, 
their dependent variables were different from the variables used in this study. For example, they 
measured post-acquisition performance with a nine-day cumulative abnormal returns from before 
compared to after the deal announcement, while the dependent variable of this study was a change 
in target ROA and ROS following the acquisition.  
One possible explanation for the observed negative effect of CEO ownership is related to the 
percentage of stock options in the CEO total ownership measure (Sanders & Hambrick, 2007). 
When the piecewise regressions were repeated on the CEO ownership excluding stock options the 
relationships became insignificant but remained negative. Since CEOs are generously awarded 
with stock-options following M&A completion, it is likely that this type of remuneration does not 
motivate management to achieve higher performance, at least in the first year after the acquisition. 
The observed negative effect of CEO ownership on target performance could happen due to the 
other factors affecting the decisions of CEOs. For example, acknowledging that voting power 
alone does not cause managerial entrenchment, Morck et al. (1988) extended their analysis to 
include the board composition and firm-age effects. For example, researchers reported that 
controlling power of a founder was good for younger firms but bad for older ones (Morck et al. 
1988, p. 311). As can be applied to our data, managerial entrenchment described by Morck at al. 
(1988) can dominate when managerial ownership is below 1%, especially in conjunction with 
other accompanying factors like weak internal control of boards.  
Also, in our sample the equity stakes held by CEOs are very small compared to the samples of 
Morck et al. (1988) and Hubbard and Palia (1995). On average, the level of CEO ownership in our 
sample is only 1.75%, that may not be enough for the positive effect to be noticed. This is 
consistent with what has been mentioned by Jensen & Murphy (1990) who argue that CEO 
ownership stakes have been in constant decline over the last 50 years, reducing goal alignment 
between agents and principals (p. 261). Therefore—in combination with other factors—CEO 
ownership below 1% could be too low for a goal alignment effect.  
Beside sample selection bias, the observed result may be interpreted in line with the suggestions 
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of Lane et al. (1998) contending with the agency inspired claim that owners are better managers. 
The authors found no positive impact of high concentration of shares (owner control) on firm’s 
market-to-book ratio. They insist that depending on the context, managers may be more efficient 
than owners. Thus, the positive effect of ownership concentration on performance may be 
exaggerated. Therefore, the observed effect of CEO ownership above 1% was not significant. 
Motivations of CEOs to Diversify and Performance of Unrelated Targets 
Much of the management literature looks at M&A as an opportunity to diversify existing 
businesses. Still, scholars warn that bidders with unrelated targets do worse, post-merger (Servaes, 
1996). The term for this phenomenon is diversification discount (Doukas & Kan, 2004). Yet the 
risk of default does not come with the acquisition of an unrelated target (Furfine & Rosen, 2011). 
It is the issue of managing unrelated target’s resources that impedes future returns (Berger & Ofek, 
1995). Drawing on existing findings, it was proposed that the performance of unrelated targets 
would be lower.  
Based on our data, target relatedness does not affect post-acquisition performance. The coefficient 
is insignificant across all multiple linear regression models. Therefore, the obtained result should 
be considered with precaution as the level of target similarity was assessed using all four digits of 
a SIC code. There were no conglomerate mergers in our data. Moreover, there was no evidence 
that managers were more generously compensated for diversifying business through acquisition 
of unrelated targets.  
To test if CEO ownership increases post-acquisition performance of unrelated targets, a relatedness 
dummy was reversed to take 1 if the target was unrelated and 0 if the target was related. Also, an 
interaction term was introduced for CEO ownership and unrelatedness. This change yielded a 
somewhat different conclusion from the one that was reached for related targets. Moderately 
unrelated targets (based on 4-digit SIC codes) have a significant positive impact on post-
acquisition target return-on-sales. In 90% of cases, if a target is unrelated its ROS development is 
on average 0.15 points higher than that of a related one. The effect of a target’s dissimilarity on 
target post-acquisition change of ROA is insignificant. 
The positive effect of acquisition of moderately unrelated targets can be explained from the point 
of view of resource complementarity presented by Harrison et al. (1991). Obviously, the resources 
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of acquirer and target can not be identical if their businesses vary. Therefore, we can assume that 
some differences in industries can complement each other and help to develop a unique 
combination of resources, valuable for the strategic advantage as suggested by Harrison et al. 
(1991). However, this explanation needs further detailed investigation on what resource 
differences were involved.   
However, the presence of an interaction term of CEO ownership and target unrelatedness 
intensifies the positive effect that business unrelatedness has on target ROS development. In the 
models including an interaction term of target unrelatedness and CEO ownership, the change in 
ROS for unrelated targets becomes even greater, growing by almost 0.21 points with 99% 
confidence, holding the other factors constant.  
Theoretical Implication 
Adding to the literature that describes CEO input in M&A outcomes, I investigated how 
managerial motivations to acquire affect the operations of an acquired firm. Unlike the most 
studies, where the explanatory variable(s) are based on stock market returns, this study uses target 
operating performance as a measure of post-acquisition result, that allows us to link managerial 
decisions regarding the target acquisition with post-acquisition performance of the same target. 
The findings of this study complement the existing knowledge on the role of top managers in post-
acquisition results.  
The most challenging outcome of this study is that CEO ownership has a negative relationship to 
post-acquisition target performance. When the multiple linear regressions are repeated with CEO 
ownership excluding stock options, the effect remains negative but becomes insignificant. This 
finding contradicts earlier research, that found a positive effect of equity-related compensation on 
post-merger performance (Datta et al., 2001; Wright et al., 2002). 
More recent studies like Devers et al. (2013) and Sanders and Hambrick (2007) emphasize the 
controversial role of stock-option grants awarded post-merger. Devers et al. (2013) urge managers 
to exercise options preceding the acquisition and to sell their stocks during the announcement 
period. Sanders and Hambrick (2007) note that executives awarded with stock-options are more 
likely to take extreme risks and to experience greater losses. The results also confirm that stock-
option managerial awards impact target performance negatively rather than positively. Given that 
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CEO’s total compensation including stock options grew on average by almost 55% for the year 
following the acquisition, these concerns can be justified.  
All three measures of CEO compensation have shown no significant role in target ROA/ROS 
development after acquisition. Such results support previous research reporting a disconnect 
between the remuneration packages of top managers compared with firm profits (Jensen & 
Murphy, 1990; Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, & Hinkin, 1987).  
Moreover, related diversification has a positive effect on post-acquisition target ROS development. 
This coincides with the suggestions of Palich, Cardinal, and Miller (2000), who found evidence 
that “diversification is positively related to performance across the low to moderate range of 
diversification” (p.161). However, their study did not focus on an M&A context. In the field of 
M&A research, we can add that targets from similar but not identical businesses perform better 
following a merger.  
More than 30 years later, we have observed a different sample characteristic from what 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989) reported. Ravenscraft and Scherer’s (1989) sample consisted of 
very profitable targets, whilst our sample is mostly comprised of firms that were underperforming 
prior to acquisition. There are many possible reasons that can explain CEO’s preference for 
underperforming targets. One of them is that top managers see unrealized opportunities within a 
target’s capabilities, which is in line with the concept of market for corporate control. Another 
possibility is that financially healthy public targets are too expensive compared to private firms of 
comparable size and financial standing. Both reasons need further investigation.  
Practical Implications  
The primary point of practical concern is that at low levels, below 1%, CEO ownership seems to 
have a significant negative effect on post-acquisition target performance. Also, in this study CEO 
ownership that includes stock options demonstrated a significant negative effect on both target 
ROA and ROS development, while the ownership measure excluding stock options did not have 
as strong of an effect but kept the negative direction. Based on our data, CEO rewards comprising 
stock-options grew significantly on the year-to-year basis (by approximately 55%) when almost 
half of the targets were underperforming prior to their acquisition. These findings could be related 
to the corporate governance issues that shareholder could pay attention for. This finding does not 
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follow the logic that agency theory would propose. Nevertheless, the results call for increased 
attention to existing corporate governance practices. 
Another implication from our findings is that the growth in target performance occurred mainly 
due to the bidding for unprofitable targets. This trend requires further research to identify the 
underlying reasoning. From a practical viewpoint, it may be a sign for investors about falsely 
positive post-acquisition returns. The question as to why so many companies selected 
underperformers and how those targets fit within the strategic goals is information that 
shareholders should be interested in.  
Finally, this paper confirms previous findings on the positive effect of moderate diversification. 
Choosing a target from a moderately unrelated business seems to improve an acquirer’s operations 
and brings about better post-acquisition outcomes. 
Limitations  
As with any research, this study has its limitations that constrain the generalizability and reliability 
of the findings. The most important weakness of the study is the relatively small number of target-
segment combinations. For some reason, companies restructure and reorganize their segments 
around M&A. Therefore, it was complicated to obtain segment reporting data and to analyze it 
over time. As a result, many accounting items were missing due to the constant change of 
segments, causing a three-fold decrease in the sample size.  
In the case of missing segment reporting items, I relied on net income in the calculation of ROA 
and ROS instead of EBIT/EBITDA. Operating earnings might have been a much more accurate 
measure of target profitability. The missing data on segment reporting for EBIT/EBITDA did not 
allow me to obtain an adequate sample for the analysis.  
The geographic region of this research is limited to US publicly traded companies, which also 
constrains the applicability of the findings across other regions. Moreover, the inclusion of only 
public companies makes its applicability for privately owned targets unclear.  
In our sample, the maximum share of CEO ownership in the firm does not exceed 9.75%. This 
brings us a very short range of equity stakes for making the reliable conclusions. This limitation 
might influence the obtained results regarding the impact of CEO ownership on target 
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performance. Therefore, the hypotheses should be checked on a larger sample with more 
variability in the range of managerial stock holdings. 
Another issue with the measures was a short amplitude of diversification. According to our sample 
characteristics, I identified target relatedness on the basis of all 4-digits of the SIC codes, as there 
are no representatives of conglomerate mergers. This set some restrictions on the findings 
regarding unrelated acquisitions. The observed positive effect of moderate diversification on post-
acquisition target performance might be erroneous and so, future replications of this study are 
necessary. 
Future research  
In this study, I analyzed managerial initiatives to undertake acquisitions as compared with target 
operation results during the first year following the acquisition. However, there is much more 
research to be done to investigate CEO motivations and perspectives in choosing and integrating 
newly bought firms.  
Future studies might assess the ways in which managerial initiatives encompass the performance 
of private targets. Also, the role of CEO initiatives in a target’s operating performance has many 
directions that can be pursued for further investigation, such as CEO’s career horizon(age) or a 
tenure in the firm.  
The motivational role of managerial compensation in post-acquisition performance is also a broad 
topic with many areas for further research (e.g. bonuses, various types stock-based compensation, 
non-material benefits, and initiative plans). Since only a few forms of compensation like base 
salary, CEO total compensation, and total compensation including exercised options were 
analyzed in this paper, future studies may include a more complete analysis of compensation forms 
and their potential impacts on the CEO decisions-making regarding acquiring and acquired targets.  
It is also important to acknowledge that the forms of CEO remuneration described previously can 
be further disaggregated. For example, restricted stocks can have a different effect on target 
performance than stock options. Many acquirers also have long-term incentive plans, the 
motivating role of which may have a postponed impact on target operating performance. 
Academic views on the role of CEO ownership in M&A evolve and transform as time and context 
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change. Recently, much academic discussion has been devoted to the large option-based awards 
granted to the bidding CEOs (Haleblian et al., 2009). Devers et al. (2013) argue that CEOs can 
exploit their stock-option grants to earn profits during the announcement period. This finding 
confirms that the origin of managerial behaviour in M&A is in agency rather than hubris (Devers 
et al., 2013).  
This study also demonstrates the problematic role of option-related compensation in post-merger 
target performance. CEO total ownership (including stock options) has a negative impact on target 
ROA/ROS development. Comparatively, without the options’ component, the effect of ownership 
is statistically insignificant. Consequently, the option-based method of CEO remuneration in the 
context of M&A requires further attention in the managerial literature.  
Another direction for future research is to analyze the financial aspects of target performance inside 
the bidding company. Most of the acquisition literature concentrates on gains and losses for 
shareholders, but the role of the target is omitted. Nevertheless, target profitability is an important 
decision-making factor for acquirers. From the scarce works on targets’ input, we know that 
companies profit when transferring resources to targets but not the other way around (Capron & 
Pistre, 2002). Understanding how targets react to various managerial decisions would benefit 






In summary, this paper examines how personal motives of CEOs to undertake M&As impact post-
acquisition target performance. The first finding of this study refers to the influence of the growth 
of CEO compensation on the post-acquisition target performance. All three measures of CEO 
compensation increased post-merger: average base salary grew by 7.48%, CEO total 
compensation by 23.95%, and CEO total compensation including exercised options by 54.89%. 
However, no significant relationship was found between CEO compensation growth and post-
acquisition target performance.   
 
Another finding is that CEO stock ownership has a significantly negative effect on post-acquisition 
target performance. Nevertheless, this result should be considered with caution as our sample did 
not have high levels of CEO ownership. The maximum ownership stake hold by a CEO is 9.741% 
while the minimum is just barely 0.001%. Furthermore, I observed that CEO holdings of less than 
1% have a significant negative effect on target ROA and ROS development. For ownership level 
above 1%, the effect on target performance is positive but insignificant. These findings add to our 
knowledge on the impact of CEO equity holdings on post-acquisition performance by 
demonstrating that a firm ownership of less than 1% is not enough to encourage CEOs to increase 
shareholder’s value.  
 
Contrary to the previous studies suggesting unrelated targets perform poorly post-acquisition (e.g. 
Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1989), I found no evidence to confirm this. This lack of evidence, though, 
may be due to the fact that our sample did not contain acquisitions from completely dissimilar 
industries. By contrast, our evidence suggests the positive impact of moderately unrelated targets 
on operating results post merger.  
The findings of this study contribute to the literature on the M&A performance by examining target 
post-acquisition operating profits, which are rarely studied. Also, understanding the ways in which 
CEOs can be motivated to improve target operations post-merger is an important contribution to 
the literature on CEO compensation in the M&A context, as it extends our knowledge on the 
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Appendix A  
Table 1: Acquirers by industry sector (n=113) 
 




Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 1 0.88 1 0.88 
Air Transportation and Shipping 3 2.65 4 3.54 
Business Services 6 5.31 10 8.85 
Chemicals and Allied Products 1 0.88 11 9.73 
Communications Equipment 2 1.77 13 11.50 
Computer and Office Equipment 7 6.19 20 17.70 
Construction Firms 1 0.88 21 18.58 
Drugs 15 13.27 36 31.86 
Electric, Gas, and Water Distribution 4 3.54 40 35.40 
Electronic and Electrical Equipment 17 15.04 57 50.44 
Food and Kindred Products 1 0.88 58 51.33 
Health Services 6 5.31 64 56.64 
Machinery 1 0.88 65 57.52 
Measuring, Medical, Photo Equipment; Clocks 10 8.85 75 66.37 
Metal and Metal Products 1 0.88 76 67.26 
Miscellaneous Retail Trade 5 4.42 81 71.68 
Motion Picture Production and Distribution 1 0.88 82 72.57 
Oil and Gas; Petroleum Refining 8 7.08 90 79.65 
Prepackaged Software 9 7.96 99 87.61 
Retail Trade-Eating and Drinking Places 1 0.88 100 88.50 
Retail Trade-Food Stores 2 1.77 102 90.27 
Retail Trade-Home Furnishings 1 0.88 103 91.15 
Sanitary Services 1 0.88 104 92.04 
Telecommunications 5 4.42 109 96.46 





Table 2: Targets by industry sector (n=113) 
 




Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 1 0.88 1 0.88 
Air Transportation and Shipping 3 2.65 4 3.54 
Business Services 12 10.62 16 14.16 
Communications Equipment 5 4.42 21 18.58 
Computer and Office Equipment 2 1.77 23 20.35 
Construction Firms 2 1.77 25 22.12 
Drugs 14 12.39 39 34.51 
Electric, Gas, and Water Distribution 4 3.54 43 38.05 
Electronic and Electrical Equipment 14 12.39 57 50.44 
Health Services 6 5.31 63 55.75 
Machinery 2 1.77 65 57.52 
Measuring, Medical, Photo Equipment; Clocks 8 7.08 73 64.60 
Metal and Metal Products 2 1.77 75 66.37 
Miscellaneous Retail Trade 2 1.77 77 68.14 
Oil and Gas; Petroleum Refining 8 7.08 85 75.22 
Prepackaged Software 11 9.73 96 84.96 
Retail Trade-Eating and Drinking Places 1 0.88 97 85.84 
Retail Trade-Food Stores 2 1.77 99 87.61 
Retail Trade-Home Furnishings 1 0.88 100 88.50 
Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 1 0.88 101 89.38 
Sanitary Services 1 0.88 102 90.27 
Telecommunications 6 5.31 108 95.58 
Textile and Apparel Products 1 0.88 109 96.46 












N Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Target ROA development 1 
            
2 Target ROS development 0.5143* 1 
           
3 Base Salary, % change -0.0535 -0.0809 1 
          
4 CEO total compensation, % 
change 0.0195 0.1676 0.2176** 1 
         
5 CEO total compensation incl. 
exercised options, % change 0.0928 0.0699 0.0233 0.1702*** 1 
        
6 Business relatedness -0.0403 -0.051 0.0536 0.0135 0.0341 1 
       
7 CEO ownership excl. stock 
options, % 0.0492 -0.0947 0.0575 0.0835 0.2111*** -0.0443 1 
      
8 CEO ownership total, % -0.0565 -0.1317 -0.0207 0.0866 0.3205* -0.01 0.8502* 1 
     
9 Stock awards dummy 0.0701 0.0853 0.1397 0.2955* -0.0868 0.0234 -0.3169* -0.4173* 1 
    
10 Mean Industry ROA by year 0.3822* 0.2807* -0.0926 0.1378 0.0471 -0.1255 -0.0652 -0.0827 0.0459 1 
   
11 Mean Industry ROS by year 0.0498 0.2543* -0.2108** -0.0359 0.0801 -0.0827 -0.1887 -0.1455 0.0115 0.2513* 1 
  
12 Target size by sales -0.1440 -0.1436 0.0841 0.0233 -0.1289 0.0129 0.0452 0.0113 0.0116 -0.0692 -0.1131 1 
 
13 Target size by assets -0.1408 -0.1074 0.1714*** 0.0423 -0.1275 0.0362 0.0661 0.0515 -0.037 -0.0757 -0.1567 0.8347* 1 
 Mean 0.0815 0.1796 7.4865 23.9527 54.8920 0.5000 1.0114 1.7557 0.7745 0.0569 0.0240 0.2460 0.1907 
 Standard deviation 0.2481 0.6979 26.8507 62.9557 198.7780 0.5025 1.7931 2.3475 0.4200 0.1960 0.1839 0.2817 0.2187 
 Number of observations 102 100 97 96 95 102 77 76 102 102 101 100 102 
 
* Statistically significant at 1% level. ** Statistically significant at 5% level. *** Statistically significant at 10% level. 


















































































2008 842.2 309.01 -44.77 2010 . 360.56 . 51.557 . 0 0.04 -68.38 
2 2007 Great 
Atlantic & 





2006 1254.6 3977 -40.1 2008 . 1077.29 . -
2899.71 
. 7.44 . 46.66 







2011 1506.91 5244.4 48.832 2013 1929.14 4526.39 . -717.98 422.23 658.78 0.01 113.19 










2008 1249.97 1399 -60.25 2010 1082.2 1333.8 . -65.18 -167.77 0 0.58 -72.44 
5 2013 Tempur 
Sealy 
INTLINC 
Sealy Corp Wood Products, 
Furniture, and 
Fixtures 
2012 1005.34 1347.9 0.01 2014 2000.6 1524.6 . 176.73 995.25 5.99 0.11 55.07 
 
                                                             
9 All targets are in the same industry with their acquirers and 100% owned after the acquisition 
